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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Laura Ann Kaehler 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Psychology 
 
June 2014 
 
Title: Trauma and Betrayal Blindness in Charitable Donations 
 
 
 Betrayal trauma theory posits betrayal events often require “betrayal blindness” in 
order to limit awareness or memory of information regarding the betrayal.  This occurs in 
order to maintain a connection that is necessary for survival.  Betrayal trauma theory may 
be applied to events that generally would not be considered traumatic, such as adultery or 
discrimination.  In order to maintain connections within relationships, institutions, and 
social systems upon which there is a dependency, people (acting as victims, perpetrators, 
and witnesses) may show betrayal blindness.  This dissertation consists of two studies 
investigating betrayal blindness and betrayal trauma history as they relate to charitable 
behavior.   
 Study 1 included 467 college students at the University of Oregon who completed 
self-report measures of trauma history and a behavioral measure requesting a 
hypothetical donation.  Contributions were requested for three scenarios that varied in 
level of betrayal: natural disaster, external genocide, and internal genocide.  Results 
indicated no significant main effects for trauma history or type of event.  However, 
people were less willing to donate to the group of recipients and the genocide conditions 
at low levels of emotional arousal.  Additionally, those who have experienced high 
betrayal traumas also were less likely to donate at low emotional response values.  Given 
 v 
the lack of significant findings in this experiment, a second study was conducted using a 
repeated measures design.   
 Study 2 involved 634 undergraduate students at the University of Oregon.  In 
addition to the measures from Study 1, participants also completed additional self-report 
measures assessing trait measures of prosocial tendencies, social desirability, personality, 
emotion regulation, and betrayal awareness.  There were no main effects on charitable 
behavior for personality traits, prosociality, emotion regulation, social desirability, or 
betrayal awareness.  Significant order effects were observed when comparing the type of 
event and betrayal level of event.  A between-subjects approach revealed people donated 
less money to the higher betrayal versions of both types of scenarios.  Across both 
studies, increased affect, particularly guilt, was associated with more charitable behavior.  
Although there are several limitations of these studies, the findings represent an 
important first step exploring prosocial behavior within a betrayal trauma framework.   
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 1 
CHAPTER I 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 Bekkers and Wiepking (2007) defined charitable giving as “the donation of 
money to an organization that benefits others beyond one’s own family” (p. 2).  In 2011, 
charitable giving in the United States amounted to $298.42 billion; individual donors 
comprised the largest category of contributors, donating a combined $217.79 billion 
(Giving USA, 2012).  According to Giving USA (2012), almost two-thirds of American 
households gave to charity for a mean amount of $870.  Most funds (32%) were provided 
to religious organizations; however, approximately $35 billion went to social or human 
services charities.   
 Much research has been conducted on the psychological, economic, and social 
factors associated with the act of giving money to those in need, including emotional 
responses and number of recipients.  However, there has been little empirical 
investigation into how trauma characteristics may relate to charitable giving. Moreover, 
the previous examinations have never utilized betrayal trauma theory (BTT; see Freyd, 
1996) as an explanatory paradigm. BTT asserts that, in order to maintain a necessary 
attachment, people may develop “betrayal blindness” that limits awareness or memory of 
the betrayal.  This dissertation aims to elucidate betrayal trauma characteristics of donors 
and events that may promote or hinder helping behavior. A brief review of the more 
established lines of research regarding correlates of helping behavior is presented first, 
followed by an overview of the recent research exploring trauma aspects of generosity.  
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Emotional Responses 
 There is extensive literature on the relationship between mood and prosocial 
activities, with emotional responses serving as both motivators for, as well as outcomes 
of, providing aid.  
Sadness 
 Research linking sadness to helping behavior is mixed.  Some evidence suggests 
that feelings of sadness promote generosity (e.g., Cialdini & Kenrick, 1976; Manucia, 
Baumann, & Cialdini, 1984; Batson et al., 1989).  Cialdini, Darby, and Vincent (1973) 
proposed a negative state relief model to explain the relationship between negative affect 
and increased helping behavior.  They argue that empathy increases sadness and so the 
person is motivated to reduce that sadness by helping.  Supporting this, Schaller and 
Cialdini (1988) found a positive relationship between empathy and sadness that was 
associated with increased helping.  However, the empathy-altruism hypothesis (e.g, 
Batson & Shaw, 1991) proposes that true empathic concern for the other is the motivation 
for the helping behavior, not the egoistic desire to reduce negative emotions.  Supporting 
this, research by Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, and Neurberg (1997) showed that 
empathic concern remained a significant predictor of willingness to help after excluding 
the effects of sadness and personal distress.  Yet, the relationship between empathic 
concern and helping was eliminated once oneness (i.e., a sense of shared identities or 
overlap between self and other) was entered into the model.  Thus, the authors argue that 
empathic concern truly represents self-other overlap, which is the motivating factor for 
the prosocial actions.  Nevertheless, the controversy appears to concern the motivation 
behind how sadness enhances helping behavior, rather than whether there is a 
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relationship (Cialdini, Baumann, & Kenrick, 1981).   
 Yet, other evidence suggests feelings of sadness may reduce generosity.  Two 
studies with children showed that, after a experiencing a sad mood induction, they 
donated less money than children who were in a positive or neutral mood (Moore, 
Underwood, & Rosenhan, 1973; Underwood, Froming, & Moore, 1977).  Other 
developmental research did not replicate this finding (Rosenhan, Underwood, & Moore, 
1974; Harris & Siebel, 1975).  When comparing charitable donations before and after 
adults viewed either a sad or neutral film, Underwood, Berenson, and colleagues (1977) 
further demonstrated that sadness reduces generosity.  However, donor ratings of 
emotions were not obtained so it is unclear what other emotions may have been 
experienced that could disrupt the sadness-helping connection (Cialdini, Baumann, & 
Kenrick, 1981).   
 Cialdini and Kenrick (1976) pointed out that much of the research revealing an 
inverse relationship between sadness and helping behavior was conducted with children.  
They proposed that young children do not yet have the association of positive affect with 
prosocial behavior and thus would not make use of helping behavior as an emotion 
regulation strategy.  Testing this hypothesis with three age groups, they revealed that the 
inverse relationship between sadness and generosity changed to a direct one as age 
increased, with the oldest age group showing a significant increase in helping behavior 
when in a negative mood.  Results from Kenrick, Baumann, and Cialdini (1979) provided 
further support for this, in that, even young children will donate more when feeling sad if 
there is the opportunity to evoke positive affect via public approval.   
 
 4 
Sympathy and Compassion 
 Eisenberg and Miller (1987) define sympathy as “an emotional response 
stemming from another’s emotional state or condition that is not identical to the other’s 
emotion, but consists of feelings of sorrow or concern for another’s welfare” (pp.  91-92). 
Sympathy is integral to attribution theory’s model of helping behavior (Rudolph, Roesch, 
Greitemeyer, & Weiner, 2004).  This theory proposes that, when confronted to provide 
aid, an evaluation is conducted to determine the reason aid is being requested.  If the 
potential helper attributes the recipient’s need to be due to factors beyond their control, 
the potential helper then feels sympathy and responds with helping behavior.  Research 
by Russell and Mentzel (1990) provide support for the connection between attribution 
and sympathy.  They performed a principal components analysis on sympathy ratings 
about 20 disasters and found a single underlying dimension, which they interpreted as 
“culpability”, that explained 67% of the variability.    
 The link between increased feelings of sympathy and higher rates of prosocial 
behavior has been well documented (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987), albeit with difficulty 
because of the frequent use of related terms such as empathy (see Batson, 2009).  
However, the studies directly assessing sympathy do show the predicted positive 
associations (Eisenberg, Fabes, et al., 1989; Eisenberg, Miller, et al., 1989; den Ouden & 
Russell, 1997).  Compassion, “the feeling that arises in witnessing another’s suffering 
and that motivates a subsequent desire to help” (Goetz, Keltner, & Simon-Thomas, 2010, 
p. 351), also relates to prosocial behavior (Piff, Kraus, Cote, Cheng, & Keltner, 2010; 
Saslow et al., 2103).   
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Anger 
 Anger is the counter emotion to sympathy in attribution theory’s model of helping 
behavior (Rudolph et al., 2004).  If the causal attribution is perceived to be controllable 
by the recipient, the emotion evoked is anger rather than sympathy.  This results in 
antisocial actions being taken, including the decision to not provide aid.  Weiner, Perry, 
and Magnusson (1988) found that participants reported greater anger and less sympathy 
for perceived “controllable” behavioral/mental stigmas (compared to physically based 
stigmas), which in turn predicted lower charitable donations.  Others researchers 
(Manucia et al., 1984; Cialdini, Baumann, & Kenrick, 1981) also suggest that feelings of 
anger and frustration would not be associated with increased helping behavior because 
those emotions are typically alleviated by taking aggressive actions.   
Guilt 
 Numerous studies have linked guilt to increased helping behavior, consistently 
revealing a strong, positive association (Miller, 2010).  In field experiments, guilt has 
been shown to promote prosocial behaviors ranging from picking up dropped papers 
(Cunningham, Steinberg, & Grev, 1980), to donating money prior to confessing at a 
Catholic church (Harris, Benson, & Hall, 1975), to agreeing to donate blood (Darlington 
& Macker, 1966).  Jordan, Mullen, and Murnighan (2011) had participants recall their 
own (im)moral behavior and then complete a questionnaire that included items assessing 
the likelihood of them donating to charity, donating blood, or volunteering.  Those who 
recalled immoral behavior had stronger prosocial intentions.  Recent studies utilizing 
various social dilemma paradigms have also demonstrated an increase in generosity after 
feelings of guilt.  Ketelaar and Au (2003) found that 91% of participants who made a 
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selfish offer in the initial round of the game and felt guilty made a generous offer the next 
time the game was played; however, 78% of those who made selfish offers initially 
continued to make selfish offers with the absence of guilt.  Research from Nelissen, 
Dijker, and deVries (2007) and de Hooge, Zeelenberg, and Breugelmans (2007) using 
social dilemma games replicated this finding; perhaps more tellingly, de Hooge et al. 
(2007) also demonstrated the effect using a measure of general cooperative tendencies.  
Further evidence suggests the feeling of guilt does not even have to be conscious to result 
in increased giving.  Zemack-Rugar, Bettman, and Fitzsimons (2007) subliminally 
primed participants with either sad or guilt affect and measured donation time to a charity 
for an unpleasant task.  Despite there being no difference in self-reported affect states 
between the two groups, those in the guilt-primed condition donated more time.  Overall, 
there is a solid line of research showing that experiences of guilt increase prosocial 
behavior, perhaps even when feeling guilty is outside of conscious awareness.   
The Identifiable Victim Effect 
 One of the most established findings regarding charitable donations is that people 
donate more to a single person than a group of people.  Identifying a specific survivor 
results in a greater willingness to donate, as well as an increase in actual donations, 
compared to providing statistical information on the number of victims (Kogut & Ritov, 
2005a, 2005b; Small & Loewenstein, 2003; Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic, 2007; Slovic, 
2007; Slovic & Västfjäll, 2010).  This reflects the “identifiable victim effect”, first 
identified by Thomas Schelling (1968). 
 In an attempt to understand causal factors of the “identifiable victim effect”, Jenni 
and Loewenstein (1997) identified and evaluated four differences between identifiable 
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and statistical victims: vividness, certainty and uncertainty, ex post versus ex ante 
evaluation, and lastly the proportion of the reference group that can be saved.  Generally, 
identifiable victims are more vivid because more information is known about them, 
particularly when details about them are shared such as photos, names, and ages.  This 
may induce a sense of familiarity that in turn results in enhanced concern.  Secondly, 
identifiable victims are perceived as certain victims, while statistical victims are, by 
definition, probable victims.  Research has shown that people are loss-averse, such that a 
certain loss is seen as worse than an uncertain loss with the same expected value 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).  Thus, the identifiable, certain victim is viewed as more 
worthy of attention and aid than statistical victims.  Typically, the decision to help an 
identified victim is made ex post, that is, after the event has occurred, while evaluation to 
assist statistical victims generally occurs ex ante, before the event has happened.  In the 
ex post situation, the role of determining responsibility (and attribution of blame) is 
heightened because it is more difficult to apply a cost-benefit analysis.  Jenni and 
Loewenstein (1997) found weak support for these explanations and suggest that the 
identifiable victim effect may be due in large part to the relationship between the 
“identified victim” and the relative size of the reference group.   
  Identifiable victims are seen to represent their own reference group with a highly 
concentrated distribution of risk.  As the reference group grows smaller, concern for the 
victim increases; thus, identifiable victims, who have a much smaller denominator than 
statistical victims, receive more care and assistance.  Fetherstonhaugh, Slovic, Johnson, 
and Friedrich (1997) demonstrated this effect, what they term “psychophysical numbing”, 
in a series of experiments.  Similar to how people’s ability to notice change in a physical 
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stimulus diminishes as the magnitude of the stimulus increases, people also show a 
reduced sensitivity to saving lives as the number of lives at risk increase.   
 Two of the studies showed that the ability to save a fixed number of lives was 
viewed more positively when there were fewer lives at risk.  Therefore, despite the same 
number of people being helped, the higher proportion was perceived as more desirable, 
even though participants themselves recognized that the interventions would save the 
same number.  The third study revealed that most of the participants raised the minimum 
number of lives saved requirement for an intervention to be funded as the at-risk group 
size increased.  When 15,000 people were at risk, the median number of lives to be saved 
was 9,000; however, when the at-risk population was increased to 290,000, the median 
increased as well (to 100,000).  This implies that people perceive saving a larger 
proportion of lives in a smaller population as more valuable than simply saving a larger 
number of people (albeit a smaller proportion).  Thus, the proportion of lives saved is 
given more consideration then the raw number of lives saved.  This has been further 
replicated (e.g., Friedrich et al., 1999; Ubel, Baron, & Asch, 2001). 
 While there is clear evidence delineating the “proportion of the reference group 
effect”, additional research suggests there is a qualitative difference between helping an 
“identified” person and helping some person, regardless of the size of the reference group 
from which they come.  Small and Lowenstein (2003) conducted a study using a 
modified “dictator game” in which an “allocator” could contribute money to a “victim” 
who had lost their funds.  The victims either were: a) already, or b) about to be, 
determined; that is, the victims were identifiable or unidentifiable, respectively.  The 
“allocators” gave more money to the determined victims.  A follow-up study with Habitat 
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for Humanity revealed the same effect: more was contributed when the family receiving 
the aid “has been selected” versus “will be selected”.    
 Research by Kogut and Ritov (2005a) found that an individual, identified victim 
generated more donations than a group of identified victims and more than unidentified 
victims regardless of number.  However, additional research showed that an identifiable 
victim in the context of statistical information significantly reduced donations compared 
to donations to just the identifiable victim (Small et al., 2007).  The authors ruled out that 
the reduction in donations was due to an increase in the size of the reference, but rather 
demonstrated that it was diminished affect, in particular sympathy, that contributed to the 
differences; this process has been referred to as the collapse of compassion.   
Collapse of Compassion 
  The term “collapse of compassion” refers to the “general phenomenon of 
diminished affective sensitivity toward groups of people in need of help” (Cameron & 
Payne, 2011, p.  2).  This may occur because people use distinct processes when making 
judgments about individual targets compared to group (Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; 
Sherman, Beike, and Ryalls, 1999; Susskind, Maurer, Thakkar, Hamilton, & Sherman, 
1999).  Processing of information about an individual victim evokes a more intense 
emotional response (see Slovic, 2007).  For example, Dickert and Slovic (2009) 
demonstrated that placing a target victim within a larger group reduces the attention 
necessary to generate affective reactions associated with helping behavior.  That is, 
sympathy was lower for the target victim when other distractor victims were present.   
 A large body of work highlights the important role affective responses play in the 
decision to provide assistance to others.  In fact, priming affective reactions results in 
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greater empathy and higher donations compared to priming cognitive deliberation 
(Dickert, Sagara, & Slovic, 2011; Small et al., 2007).  Information about single survivors 
is more vivid and emotionally distressing than information about multiple survivors 
(Kogut & Ritov 2005a, Kogut & Ritov 2005b).  Additional research has shown the effect 
is present for dyads as well; even when paired with only one other person, compassion 
and subsequent donations were less than when each were presented individually 
(Västfjall, Peters, & Slovic, 2009, as cited by Slovic & Västfjall, 2010).  Cameron and 
Payne (2011) showed that participants, when having the expectation of being requested to 
donate, regulated emotion toward groups proactively, thereby preventing themselves 
from ever experiencing as much emotion toward groups as toward individuals.  This 
proactive emotion regulation may drive the collapse of compassion.   
Altruism and Personal History of Trauma Exposure 
 There is a commonly held belief, which has received empirical support, that 
violence begets violence.  For example, childhood abuse is frequently associated with 
hostility, aggression, and antisocial behaviors in childhood (Koening, Cicchetti, & 
Rogosch, 2004) and adulthood (Horowitz, Widom, McLaughlin, & White, 2001).  
Keresteš (2006) found that the number of stressful and traumatic war experiences a child 
was exposed to during the Croatian war self-reported as being more aggressive.  A recent 
meta-analysis (Wilson, Stover, & Berkowitz, 2009) found a moderate to large effect size 
between experiencing violence and antisocial behavior in adolescence.  Also, high levels 
of violence and other negative experiences in one’s neighborhood is a risk factor for later 
aggressive behavior (Valois, MacDonald, Bretous, Fischer, & Drane, 2002).  This would 
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suggest persons who have experienced violence would be less likely to act in altruistic 
ways.   
 An alterative hypothesis is that altruism may be one form of posttraumatic 
growth, in that experiencing a traumatic event may increase empathy (Tedeschi, Park, & 
Calhoun, 1998).  Staub (2003) has coined the phrase ‘‘altruism born of suffering’’ to 
describe how individuals who have suffered may become particularly motivated to help 
others (see Voldhart, 2009 for a review).  However, “the possibility that previous adverse 
life experiences could motivate altruism and prosocial behavior, even toward outgroup 
members, has not been studied systematically, nor has it been recognized in research on 
prosocial behavior within social psychology” (Voldhart, 2009, p. 88).  In fact, Frazier and 
colleagues (2012) stated that a recent volume on prosocial behavior (i.e., Mikulincer & 
Shaver, 2010) did not address trauma at all and a literature review of a leading 
psychological trauma journal contained no references to prosocial behavior or altruism.   
Despite this, some evidence does suggest prosocial behavior resulting from adverse 
experiences does occur.   
 Kaniasty and Norris (1995) showed that survivors of Hurricane Hugo had more 
prosocial behavior than non-victims and higher levels of suffering predicted increased 
levels of helping other victims.  After 9/11, Piferi, Jobe, and Jones (2006) found that a 
majority of participants provided some type of support, for example, money (66%) or 
blood donations (24%), to those affected by the attacks on the World Trade Center.  
Previous research had also demonstrated helping behaviors following this event (Schuster 
et al., 2001; Wayment, 2004; Yum & Schenck-Hamlin, 2005).  One year after the war in 
Crotia started, preschool children were rated as more prosocial by their teachers 
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compared to their levels immediately before the war began (Raboteg-Šarić, Žužul, & 
Keresteš, 1994).   However, much of this aforementioned research was conducted with 
people who were not directly affected by the events but rather vicariously experienced 
them. 
 A study by Koening et al. (2004) compared the amount of donations made by 
physically maltreated, neglected, and non-maltreated children from low socioeconomic 
backgrounds.  Physically abused girls donated fewer dimes than did neglected girls, but 
there were no other significant group differences.  Thus, these data generally did not 
support either prosocial or antisocial tendencies.  An important limitation of this research 
project was the low base rate of donations (approximately 25% of children made a 
donation). 
 Frazier and colleagues (2012) directly explored the relationship between trauma 
exposure and prosocial behavior, looking at daily helping behavior and volunteering.  
Daily helping behavior items were “helped out someone in need”, “provided emotional 
support to someone”, “volunteered my time”, and “gave money to a person in need”.  
They found that experiencing more traumatic events was associated with more daily 
helping behaviors and more volunteer activities.  Furthermore, they showed that those 
who had experienced a recent trauma engaged in more prosocial activities than those who 
had not experienced a recent event.   
 While the interest in this area grows, there are still very few studies that have been 
conducted specifically to examine the relationship between trauma and prosocial 
behavior.  Generally, the studies rely on self-report measures in that behavioral measures 
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are not incorporated into these designs typically.  It is imperative additional empirical 
research is conducted to test these hypotheses.   
Aid and Type of Event 
 One factor that may be associated with charitable giving that rarely has been 
explored is type of traumatic event.  For example, are there differences in donations for 
natural disasters compared to war relief? An analysis conducted by the Stanford Social 
Innovation Review revealed that aid is skewed toward assisting survivors of emergency 
conditions and less toward helping those suffering from chronic conditions (e.g., poverty, 
AIDS, and malaria; Epstein, 2006; Spence, 2006).   
 Utilizing multiple experiments, Small (2010) empirically demonstrated that 
victims recovering from a loss are more sympathetic and provided with more helping 
behavior than those suffering from a chronic condition. In her first study, participants 
were randomly assigned to read scenarios describing a character who was either blind, 
physically challenged, or deaf.  The scenarios differed only in terms of how long the 
person has had the health challenge: constant-state (entire life) or loss-state (recently 
developed).  Results revealed higher sympathy ratings for the loss-state group.  Her 
second experiment made use of an anonymous allocation task based on the “dictator” 
game during which participants could give money to less fortunate recipients who had 
either started the game with nothing (constant-state) or had forfeited their money by 
design of the research study (loss-state).  People reported more sympathy for, and 
allocated more money to, those who began the game with funds and later lost them. 
Additional experiments by Small (2010) showed victims of a recent loss are deemed as 
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more deserving than those from a chronic condition, even when endorsing that they 
deserve equal treatment.   
 Recent research has suggested that the perceived cause of disaster also influences 
donation behavior (Zagefka, Noor, Brown, De Moura, & Hopthrow, 2011).  Greater 
willingness to donate to natural rather than humanly caused disasters was demonstrated 
over a series of four experiments.  In the first study, participants were provided with one 
of two flood scenarios and answered a single question assessing willingness to donate on 
a 7-point rating scale.  In both scenarios, the flood was caused by a dam failure; however, 
the cause of the dam collapsing was manipulated to present either a “natural” or a 
“human” explanation.  The “natural” reason was simply the strength of the storm 
overpowered the dam, while the “human” condition had the dam collapse because it was 
poorly built due to government embezzlement of the funds.  This study showed a 
significantly higher willingness to donate to survivors of the natural flood than to those 
from a humanly caused flood.    
 The second study (Zagefka et al., 2011) attempted to understand the mechanisms 
behind the differences in willingness to aid based on cause.  Participants read text 
describing either the South Asian Tsunami disaster or the Darfur genocide and answered 
questions regarding perceived cause, victim blame, victim self-help, and willingness to 
donate.  Again, participants were more willing to donate to the natural event, the 
“Tsunami” condition.  The mediators of victim-blame and victim self-help were also 
significant.  In the third study, the participants read fictitious accounts of disasters but 
were provided “compensation” that could then be donated.  The scenario in this study 
was a famine caused either by a natural drought or armed conflict.  As before, donation 
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behavior was higher for victims of the natural disaster because they are perceived as less 
“blamable” and more “self-helping”.   
 The final study (Zagefka et al., 2011) provided further empirical support for the 
causality of perceived “victim blame” and “victim self-help”.  Thus, evidence suggests 
that people are less willing to donate to survivors of humanly caused conditions than to 
survivors of natural disasters.  The researchers further demonstrated why this difference 
happens:  a systemic bias of higher perceived blame and lower perceived self-reliance for 
those in the humanly caused scenarios.  The authors interpreted these findings as 
consistent with the just world hypothesis, in that humanly caused events provide more 
opportunities to blame the victims as deserving for what happened to them.  When 
survivors are perceived to be responsible for their own misfortune, donors may deny any 
of their own responsibility for providing aid (Furnham, 1995).   
 In a follow-up study, Zagefka, Noor, Brown, Hopthrow, and De Moura (2012) 
presented participants with seven disaster scenarios (i.e., 3 civil wars, 2 hurricanes, a 
famine, and an earthquake) and provided hypothetical money that they could donate to 
one cause or divide and donate to two causes.  After making their choices, respondents 
then provided up to three reasons for why they either selected or did not select that 
scenario.  As previously found, the average amount donated to the four natural disasters 
was higher than the amount donated to the humanly caused events.  The five most 
frequently self-reported rationales for donating (or not), in order, were: perceived need, 
perceived impact, perceived donations by others, cause, and victim blame.  In a re-
analysis of the data from the second study in Zagefka et al. (2011), the investigators 
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found that the Tsunami condition had higher perceived impact and higher perceived need 
than the Darfur condition.   
 This line of research provides clear evidence that willingness to donate is higher 
for natural events.  Survivors of humanly caused disasters are perceived as more 
blamable and less self-sufficient in the recovery effort.  There is also a perception that a 
donation is less needed and will have less of an impact when given to those suffering 
from a “human-caused” condition.  However, an alternative framework for understanding 
these findings is provided by betrayal trauma theory (BTT; see Freyd, 1996).   
Betrayal Trauma Theory 
 According to the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed., text rev.; DSM–IV–TR; American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000), events are considered traumatic if they (a) include a loss of "physical 
integrity", or a risk of serious injury or death and (b) produce a response of intense fear, 
horror or helplessness.  However, Freyd (1996) argues a core issue of trauma, in addition 
to fear/terror, is betrayal, which she defines as the “violation of implicit or explicit trust” 
(p. 9).  She proposes a two-dimensional model of traumatic events consisting of both fear 
and betrayal responses.  An example of a high fear/high betrayal event is genocide; a 
hurricane or other natural disaster may be high fear, but generally is low in betrayal (an 
exception to this might be Hurricane Katrina).   
 According to BTT, under certain circumstances, betrayal events require “betrayal 
blindness” so that there is limited or no conscious awareness or memory of knowledge 
around the betrayal.  This is typically done in order to preserve an attachment that is 
necessary for survival.  To illustrate, consider the case of childhood abuse perpetrated by 
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a caregiver.  The child is dependent on this caregiver to meet his or her needs, however 
this same person is being abusive and distrustful.  It may be more advantageous for the 
child to stifle their response to the betrayal (i.e., withdrawal) in an effort to maintain a 
close relationship with the parent.  However, while the short-term advantage of betrayal 
blindness is clear, there are negative outcomes associated with it as well.   
 A large, growing body of literature demonstrates betrayal is a profound factor in 
predicting people’s responses to traumas they experience.  Betrayal has been connected 
to borderline personality disorder (Kaehler & Freyd, 2009), physical illness (Freyd, Klest, 
& Allard, 2005), posttraumatic stress disorder (Kelley, 2010), and revictimization (Gobin 
& Freyd, 2009).  In addition to responses to first-hand traumatic experiences, betrayal 
may be an important influence on people’s reactions to traumas disclosed to them.  
Foynes (2009) found that experiencing high betrayal traumas was associated with 
negative responses to disclosures of such traumas (e.g., disbelief, denial, or hostility).  
However, there was not an association with experiencing low betrayal traumas and 
negative responses to their disclosures.   
 While betrayal trauma history has never been examined before in relation to 
prosocial behavior specifically, constructs (i.e., trust and attachment style) that are also 
associated with betrayal trauma history have been.  Generally, prosocial behavior tends to 
increase as trust rises (Bekkers, 2003; Bekkers, 2007; Cadenhead & Richman, 1996).  
Research has shown higher levels of social trust predicted greater donation amounts 
(Brooks, 2005) and more volunteering (Brown & Ferris, 2007) to secular and religious 
charities.  Persons with high betrayal trauma histories report lower levels of trust.  Gobin 
and Freyd (2009) found persons with a high betrayal trauma history had significantly 
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lower general levels of trust than people with no high betrayal trauma history.  Follow-up 
work by Gobin (2012) showed a significant negative linear contrast with betrayal trauma 
history and general trust; participants with no betrayal trauma history had the highest 
levels of general trust.   
 Attachment style is an individual’s typical pattern of beliefs, feelings, and 
behaviors about relationships that developed from early interactions with caregivers 
(Hazan & Shaver, 1987; for a review, see Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003).  Brennan, Clark, 
and Shaver (1998) demonstrated that attachment styles vary along two independent 
dimensions: avoidance and anxiety.  Attachment avoidance reflects a desire to maintain 
mutual distance and independence in the relationship; attachment anxiety refers to 
insecurity about the other person’s availability and responsiveness.  People who are low 
on both aspects are considered securely attached.  High betrayal trauma history has been 
associated with both anxious and avoidant attachment characteristics (Owen, Quirk, & 
Manthos, 2012).  Research has revealed a positive association between attachment 
security and prosocial behavior (Gillath et al., 2005; Mikulincer, Shaver, Gillath, & 
Nitzberg, 2005; Thompson & Gullone, 2008).  However, while Wayment (2006) found 
no direct link, there was a negative indirect link between avoidance and helping 
behaviors after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, mediated via empathy.   
 Betrayal blindness also applies to situations that are not generally considered 
“traumatic”, for example, adultery, bullying, and discrimination.  “Both victims, 
perpetrators, and witnesses may display betrayal blindness in order to preserve 
relationships, institutions, and social systems upon which they depend” (Freyd, 2009, 
Some FAQs, para. 4).  Zurbriggen (2005) applied BTT to the 2004 Presidential election.  
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She suggests the American people, specifically conservatives, were psychologically 
dependent on George W.  Bush to defend their shared values.  As a result of this 
dependence, they were less likely to be aware of his administration’s deceptions in order 
to maintain that connection.   
 BTT may also apply to understanding people’s responses to charitable causes.  
According to BTT, events that threaten personal relationships or worldviews (e.g., 
humanly-causes disasters) would result in greater avoidance of emotions, thoughts, and 
experiences (i.e., similar to collapse of compassion), producing less willingness to 
donate.  As work from Zagefka et al. (2011; 2012) show, donations are less to survivors 
of humanly caused disasters because they are perceived to be responsible for their own 
suffering and less needy.  Under the BTT premise, this victim blaming and minimizing of 
need may occur in order to maintain a psychological connection that is threatened by 
awareness of this information.   
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CHAPTER II 
INTRODUCTION – STUDY 1 
 This exploratory study was undertaken to explore how trauma (both in terms of 
personal history and types of traumatic events) relates to charitable donations.  As 
previously mentioned, this is a currently understudied area of research and has never been 
examined from a betrayal trauma framework.   
Summary of Purposes and Goals 
 While there is solid theoretical rationale for trauma increasing prosocial behavior, 
there has been limited empirical research on the topic.  Frazier and colleagues (2012) 
demonstrated that persons who have experienced a traumatic event, particularly recently, 
engaged in higher levels of prosocial behaviors.   However, this study relied on self-
report measures of helping behavior and so may be subject to socially desirable 
responding.  Thus, this study adds to the literature by including a behavioral task of 
providing aid, making a hypothetical charitable donation.  This paradigm has been used 
in previous research (e.g., Dickert, Sagara, & Slovic, 2011).  Furthermore, this design 
allows us to examine state prosocial behavior in response to a specific solicitation of aid, 
which can be used to identify the mechanisms behind how trauma history can lead to 
increased prosocial behavior. 
 Additionally, trauma history was assessed by Brief Betrayal Trauma Survey 
(Goldberg & Freyd, 2006).  In the Frazier et al. (2012) study, the most common traumatic 
events endorsed were death of loved one (47%), a life-threatening event experienced by a 
loved one (30%), and childhood witnessing family violence (23%).  This contrasts with 
typical trauma histories seen at the University of Oregon, where approximately 35% of 
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participants report physical abuse, sexual abuse, or emotional abuse (e.g., Gobin & Freyd, 
2009).  This allowed us to explore the relationship between personal trauma history and 
help giving in a differently traumatized sample and evaluating specifically the role of 
betrayal trauma history.   
 A new line of research examining how people respond to events that vary in 
causal attributions has been promoted by Zagefka and associates (2011; 2012).  They 
have consistently shown that participants provide less aid to survivors of humanly-caused 
disasters.  Their findings align with what is predicted by BTT, although they do not 
interpret their results in this manner.  This study attempted to replicate their findings and 
expand on them using betrayal as a predictor.  Thus, the event that is lower in betrayal 
(i.e., natural disaster) would receive more aid.   
 Importantly, this study is the first of which we are aware to examine both trauma 
history and type of event simultaneously.  This allowed us to ascertain any interaction 
between the two constructs that might influence charitable behavior.  Volhardt (2009) 
suggests that observing someone suffering from an experience similar to one that has 
been personally experienced can produce prosocial behavior in an effort to reduce 
distress activated by the triggered trauma memories (Volhardt, 2009).  Moreover, a 
frequent observation is that donations increase as similarity between donator and receipt 
increase (Bekkers, & Wiepking, 2007).  Thus, people who experienced a certain betrayal 
event may provide more helping behavior to survivors of a similar level of betrayal event, 
that is, a survivor of a natural disaster may provide more help to a victim from a natural 
disaster.   
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Hypotheses and Research Questions 
! Hypothesis 1: Willingness to donate and amount donated will be higher for the 
single, identified survivor.   
! Hypothesis 2: Increased affect will be associated with greater willingness to 
donate and higher donation amounts; however, anger and perceived betrayal 
would show a negative association with willingness to donate and amount 
donated. 
! Hypothesis 3: There will be a negative linear association between type of betrayal 
event and donation willingness and amounts.  
! Research Question 1: Is a personal history of betrayal trauma associated with 
more or less charitable behavior?  
! Research Question 2: Is there an association between number of recipients and 
type of event that impacts willingness to donate and amount donated? 
! Research Question 3: Is there an association between personal trauma history and 
number of recipients that impacts willingness to donate and amount donated? 
! Research Question 4: Is there an association between personal trauma history and 
type of event that impacts willingness to donate and amount donated? 
! Research Question 5: Is there an interaction between the different emotional 
responses and number of recipients?   
! Research Question 6: Is there an interaction between the different emotional 
responses and type of event?   
! Research Question 7: Is there an interaction between the different emotional 
responses and trauma history? 
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CHAPTER III 
METHOD – STUDY 1 
Participants 
 Participants were undergraduates students (N=467, 65.1% women) recruited from 
the University of Oregon Human Subjects Pool.  The sample consisted predominantly of 
young persons whose ages ranged from 17 to 52 (M=20.3, SD= 4.33).  Approximately 
78% of the sample identified as Caucasian.  For this sample, 67% were women (79% 
Caucasian) whose ages ranged from 17 to 52 (M=20.3, SD= 4.33).   
  Participants were recruited online without knowledge of the study content prior 
to registering for the study, thus minimizing self-selection bias.  They earned partial 
credit for a research course requirement for participating.  Before beginning the survey, 
each respondent was given a unique identification number to ensure anonymous 
responses.  All variables had 3.2% or less missing data.  Listwise deletion was used to 
handle missing data, resulting in a sample size of 428 participants. 
 
Materials 
 
Demographics Questionnaire 
 Demographic information was collected regarding age, gender, and ethnicity.  
The Human Subjects Coordinator, who manages the Human Subjects pool and General 
Survey studies, developed the questionnaire.   
Brief Betrayal Trauma Survey 
 
 The Brief Betrayal Trauma Survey (BBTS; Goldberg & Freyd, 2006) is a 14-item, 
self-report measure of major traumatic events participants may have experienced.  Each 
item is classified as having one of three levels of betrayal: low, medium, or high.  Non-
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interpersonal traumas (e.g., natural disaster) are conceptualized as a low-betrayal event, 
while interpersonal traumas (e.g., child sexual abuse) are considered a medium- or high-
betrayal.  Relational closeness of the perpetrator distinguishes high-betrayal (i.e., 
“someone with whom you were very close”) from medium-betrayal (i.e., “someone with 
whom you were not so close”) items.  For each item, participants indicated how 
frequently the event occurred (never, 1 or 2 times, or more than that) and whether it took 
place before the age of 18, after the age of 18, or during both time periods.  The BBTS 
has demonstrated good construct validity (DePrince, 2001), convergent validity (Martin, 
Cromer, DePrince, & Freyd, 2010), and test-retest reliability (Goldberg & Freyd, 2006).  
For childhood events, Goldberg and Freyd (2006) found agreement between test 
administrations of 83% (gamma coefficients ranged from .54 to .93) and 75% for 
adulthood events (gamma coefficients ranged from .27 to .91).   
Charitable Behavior Vignettes 
 Adapted from Small et al. (2007), six vignettes were created to represent three 
events of differing levels of betrayal.  Event A was a natural disaster (i.e., a flood, a low 
betrayal), Event B was external genocide (i.e., perpetrated by members outside the 
village, a medium betrayal), and Event C was internal genocide (i.e., perpetrated by 
neighbors, a high betrayal).  For each event, the donation was to be given to either a 
single child or a group of 4 children.  Each participant was presented with hypothetical $5 
bills (totaling $50), the vignette and a photo, and were asked if (a) they would be willing 
to donate and (b) the amount to be donated.  Participants also reported their emotional 
responses on a 7-point rating scale (not at all to very much) for the emotions of sadness, 
 25 
sympathy and compassion, anger, guilt, and perceived betrayal of event.  Participants 
were randomly assigned to one vignette.   
Procedure 
 The measures were completed online as part of the General Survey, which is a 
battery of approximately 15 questionnaires submitted by many researchers.  Human 
subjects approval and subsequent participant informed consent were obtained for the 
entire survey rather than individual measures.  Participants were given an option to 
decline to answer any item without penalty.  The survey was designed to take no more 
than two hours to complete; data are not available regarding average time to complete the 
study.   
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS – STUDY 1 
 Overall, 94% of the sample (n = 402) made a hypothetical donation, leaving a 
small sample size (n = 26) of those not willing to donate.  Given the small sample size of 
non-willing group, only approximately one to three parameters would be estimated 
without bias using logistic regression (e.g., see Stoltzfus, 2011).  Because of this, when 
appropriate, nonparametric tests were used to answer research questions regarding 
willingness to donate.  The average amount donated was 19.2 (SD =15.4). 
Hypotheses and Research Questions 
Hypothesis 1: Willingness to Donate and Amount Donated Will Be Higher for the 
Single, Identified Survivor. 
 There was not an association between number of recipients and willingness to 
donate, χ2 (1, N = 428) = 1.28, p = .258, ϕ = .055; see Figure 1.   
 
   
Figure 1.  Percentage of participants willing to donate by number of recipients receiving 
donation in Study 1. 
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 The average amount donated to the single recipient was 19.0 (SD = 14.3, SE = 
1.08), while the average amount donated to the group was 19.4 (SD = 16.1, SE =1.02).  
After controlling for the effects of the covariates, the average estimated amount donated 
was 19.0 (SE = 1.18) for the single recipient and 20.3 (SE = 1.08) for the group of 
children; see Figure 2.  This was not a significant difference, F(1, 380) = 0.28, p = .600, 
ηp2 = .001.   
 
 
Figure 2.  Estimated mean donation amounts by number of recipients. Est. = estimated. 
Error bars represent standard errors in Study 1.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Increased Affect Will Be Associated With Greater Willingness to 
Donate and Higher Donation Amounts; However, Anger and Perceived Betrayal 
Would Show a Negative Association With Willingness to Donate and Amount 
Donated. 
 Point-biserial correlations showed an association between increasing emotional 
responses and higher rates of willingness to donate for all emotional variables: sadness, 
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r(426) = .181, p < .001, r2 = .033, guilt r(426) = .325, p < .001, r2 = .106, and betrayal 
r(426) = .116, p = .016, r2 = .013, see Figure 3.  However, when controlling for the 
effects of the other emotional variables, only sympathy, r(422) = .110, p = .023, r2 = 
.012,  and guilt, r(422) = .202, p < .001, r2 = .041, were significantly associated with 
willingness to donate.   
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Percentage of participants willing to donate by emotional response ratings in 
Study 1. 
 
 See Table 1 for means and standard deviations for amount donated and the 
emotional response variables; correlations among these variables are also provided.  See 
Figure 4 for a plot of the mean amounts donated by emotional response values.  All 
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 After controlling for the effects of the covariates, only sympathy and guilt 
significantly predicted amount donated, such that increased feelings of sympathy (p < 
.01) and guilt (p < .001) were associated with higher donation amounts.  See Table 2 for 
the results of the F-tests. 
 
Table 1.  Correlations among Emotional Response Variables and Amount Donated in 
Study 1. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
1.  Amount donated -      
2.  Sad .363** -     
3.  Sympathy .400** .724** -    
4.  Anger .296** .622** .525** -   
5.  Guilt .464** .589** .563** .477** -  
6.  Betrayal  .223** .384** .274** .536** .332** - 
Mean 19.2 4.86 5.40 4.29 4.52 3.73 
Standard deviation 15.4 1.56 1.44 1.75 1.85 1.77 
       
Note.  ** p < .01. 
 
 
Figure 4.  Average amount donated by emotional response ratings in Study 1.    
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Table 2.  Results of Emotional Responses Predicting Amount Donated in Study 1.   
Source SS df MS F p ηp2 
Sad 14.5 1 14.5 0.08 .776 <.001 
Sympathy 1444.5 1 1444.5 8.06 .005 .021 
Anger 74.5 1 74.5 0.42 .520 .001 
Guilty 5111.3 1 5111.3     28.5 .000 .070  
Betrayal 304.1 1 304.1 1.70 .194 .004 
Error 68110.6 380 179.2    
Corrected Total 101128.2 427     
 
Hypothesis 3: There Will Be a Negative Linear Association Between Type of 
Betrayal Event and Donation Willingness and Amounts. 
 Type of traumatic event and willingness to donate were not significantly 
associated, χ2 (2, N = 428) = 0.33, p = .849, Cramer’s V = .028; see Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5.  Percentage of participants willing to donate by type of traumatic event in Study 
1.   
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 The average amounts donated to the groups are as follows: the natural disaster 
group (M =20.5, SD = 15.9, SE = 1.58), external genocide (M =18.7, SD = 14.5, SE = 
1.17), and external genocide (M =18.9, SD = 15.9, SE = 1.21).  After controlling for the 
effects of the covariates, the average amounts donated to the groups became: the natural 
disaster group (M =21.0, SE = 1.60), external genocide (M =19.5, SE = 1.27), and 
external genocide (M =18.3, SE = 1.30); see Figure 6.  Mean donation amounts did not 
differ among the three traumatic events, F(2, 380) = 0.57, p = .567, ηp2 = .003.   
 
 
Figure 6.  Estimated mean amount donated for each type of traumatic event in Study 1. 
Est. = estimated. Error bars represent standard errors.  
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= .051.  Subsequent univariate ANOVAs indicated that only perceived betrayal 
significantly differed across the three groups, F(2, 425) = 12.1, p < .001, η2 = .054; there 
were non-significant effects for type of event on: sadness, F(2, 425) = 0.48, p = .621, η2 = 
.002; sympathy, F(2, 425) = 2.73, p = .066, η2 = .013; anger, F(2, 425) = 1.60, p = .204, 
η2 = .007; and guilt, F(2, 425) = 1.49, p = .227, η2 = .007.  Tukey’s post hoc comparisons 
revealed that the natural disaster vignette (M =3.03, SD = 1.76, SE = 0.17) had a 
significantly lower betrayal rating than both the external genocide (M = 3.80, SD = 1.71, 
SE = 0.14) and the internal genocide (M = 4.08, SD = 1.71, SE = 0.13) scenarios, p = .001 
and p < .001, respectively.  There was not a significant difference between the external 
and internal versions, p = .332.   
 A new variable was created combining the genocide conditions.  There remained 
a non-significant association between type of traumatic event and willingness to donate, 
χ2 (1, N = 428) = 0.32, p = .570, ϕ = -.027.  The average amount donated to the natural 
disaster group was 20.5 (SD = 15.9, SE = 1.58) and to the genocide group was 18.8 (SD = 
15.2, SE = 0.84).  After controlling for the effects of the covariates, the average amounts 
donated to the groups became: the natural disaster group (M =21.0, SE = 1.61) and 
genocide group (M =18.8, SE = 0.88).  There was not a significant difference in the 
amounts donated for the genocide and natural disaster events, F(1, 391) = 0.22, p = .641, 
ηp2 = .001.   
Research Question 1: Is a Personal History of Betrayal Trauma Associated with 
More or Less Charitable Behavior? 
 Participants’ responses were summed across the number of BBTS items endorsed 
for each level of betrayal regardless of when the event occurred.  Participants were then 
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hierarchically classified based on the highest level of betrayal event they had 
experienced.  Thus, those in highest group may have experienced lower betrayal traumas.  
Table 3 includes the BBTS items comprising the betrayal categories (i.e., Lower and 
Higher Betrayal) according to Freyd’s (2011) suggestions.  Of the sample, 71% (n = 304) 
endorsed at least one of these items; 59.1% (n = 253) reported experiencing at least one 
lower betrayal item and 51.9% (n = 296) survived a higher betrayal event.  Three groups 
were created to represent trauma history: none (n = 124), lower betrayal (n = 82), and 
higher betrayal (n = 222). 
 
Table 3.  Categorization of Betrayal Trauma Events. 
Higher Betrayal Trauma Events 
Witnessed someone with whom you were very close (such as a parent, brother or sister, 
caretaker, or intimate partner) committing suicide, being killed, or being injured by 
another person so severely as to result in marks, bruises, burns, blood, or broken bones.  
This might include a close friend in combat. 
Witnessed someone with whom you were very close deliberately attack another family 
member so severely as to result in marks, bruises, blood, broken bones, or broken teeth. 
You were deliberately attacked that severely by someone with whom you were very 
close. 
You were made to have some form of sexual contact, such as touching or penetration, by 
someone with whom you were very close (such as a parent or lover). 
You were emotionally or psychologically mistreated over a significant period of time by 
someone with whom you were very close (such as a parent or lover). 
Lower Betrayal Trauma Events 
Been in a major earthquake, fire, flood, hurricane, or tornado that resulted in significant 
loss of personal property, serious injury to yourself or a significant other, the death of a 
significant other, or the fear of your own death. 
Been in a major automobile, boat, motorcycle, plane, train, or industrial accident that 
resulted in similar consequences. 
Witnessed someone with whom you were not so close undergoing a similar kind of 
traumatic event. 
Witnessed someone with whom you were not so close deliberately attack a family 
member that severely. 
You were deliberately attacked that severely by someone with whom you were not close. 
You were made to have such sexual contact by someone with whom you were not close. 
You were emotionally or psychologically mistreated over a significant period of time by 
someone with whom you were not close. 
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 Willingness to donate did not vary across personal trauma histories, χ2 (2, N = 
428) = 2.39, p = .302, Cramer’s V = .075; see Figure 7.   
 
 
Figure 7.  Percentage of participants willing to donate by history of betrayal trauma in 
Study 1. None = no betrayal trauma history; Lower = history of at least one lower 
betrayal trauma; Higher = history of at least one higher betrayal trauma. 
 
 
 The average amounts donated by the trauma groups are as follows: no betrayal 
group (M =18.7, SD = 15.6, SE = 1.40), lower betrayal group (M =20.7, SD = 16.7, SE = 
1.84), and higher betrayal group (M =19.0, SD = 14.8, SE = 0.99).  After controlling for 
the effects of the covariates, the average amounts donated by the groups became: the no 
betrayal history group (M =19.7, SE = 1.42), lower betrayal group (M =20.4, SE = 1.62), 
and higher betrayal group (M =18.8, SE = 0.99); see Figure 8.  There was not a 
significant main effect of betrayal trauma group membership, F(2, 380) = 0.95, p = .388, 
ηp2 = .005.   
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Figure 8.  Estimated mean amount donated by history of betrayal trauma in Study 1. 
None = no betrayal trauma history; Lower = history of at least one lower betrayal trauma; 
Higher = history of at least one higher betrayal trauma. Est. = estimated. Error bars 
represent standard errors.  
 
 
 
Research Question 2: Is There an Association Between Number of Recipients and 
Type of Event That Impacts Willingness to Donate and Amount Donated? 
 There was not a significant interaction between number of recipients and type of 
traumatic event on willingness to donate (p = .939, two-tailed Fisher’s exact test, 
Cramer’s V = .062); see Figure 9.   
 See Table 4 for means and standard deviations of amount donated for the number 
of recipients by type of traumatic event interaction.  After controlling for the effects of 
the covariates, the estimated means are shown in Table 5 and Figure 10.  There was not a 
significant interaction between number of recipients and type of trauma, F(2, 380) = 1.56, 
p = .211, ηp2 = .008.   
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Figure 9.  Percentage of participants willing to donate by number of recipients of 
donation and type of traumatic event in Study 1.  Group = four children; Single = 
individual recipient of donation.   
 
  
Table 4.  Means and Standard Deviations of Amount Donated by Number of Recipients 
and Type of Traumatic Event in Study 1. 
 Type of Traumatic Event   
Number of Recipients Natural Disaster 
External  
Genocide 
Internal  
Genocide 
 
 
Single  21.37 (15.3) 19.47 (14.4) 15.88 (13.0)   
Group 19.71 (16.7) 18.01 (14.7) 20.20 (16.8)   
Note.  Standard deviations in parentheses.  N = 428.   
 
 
Table 5.  Estimated Means and Standard Errors of Amount Donated by Number of 
Recipients and Type of Traumatic Event in Study 1. 
 Type of Traumatic Event   
Number of Recipients Natural Disaster 
External  
Genocide 
Internal  
Genocide 
 
 
Single  22.45 (215) 18.31 (1.83) 16.13 (2.17)   
Group 19.64 (2.34) 20.79 (1.76) 20.49 (1.34)   
Note.  Standard errors in parentheses.  N = 428.   
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 There remained a non-significant association between type of traumatic event and 
willingness to donate when comparing the natural disaster condition to the combined 
genocide groups, (p = .753, two-tailed Fisher’s exact test, ϕ = .059).  See Table 6 for 
means and standard deviations of amount donated for the number of recipients for the 
natural disaster and genocide conditions.  After controlling for the effects of the 
covariates, the estimated means are shown in Table 7.  There was not a significant 
interaction between number of recipients and type of trauma on amount donated when 
using the combined traumatic events, F(1, 391) = 2.64, p = .105, ηp2 = .007. 
 
Table 6.  Means and Standard Deviations of Amount Donated by Number of Recipients 
and Combined Type of Traumatic Events in Study 1. 
 Type of Traumatic Event   
Number of Recipients Natural Disaster  Genocide 
 
 
Single  21.37 (15.3) 18.02 (13.9)   
Group 19.71 (16.7) 19.35 (16.0)   
Note.  Standard deviations in parentheses.  N = 428.   
 
 
Table 7.  Estimated Means and Standard Errors of Amount Donated by Number of 
Recipients and Combined Type of Traumatic Event in Study 1. 
 Type of Traumatic Event   
Number of Recipients Natural Disaster  Genocide 
 
 
Single  22.55 (2.16) 17.31 (1.40)   
Group 19.54 (2.35) 20.24 (1.06)   
Note.  Standard errors in parentheses.  N = 428.    
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Figure 10.  Estimated mean amount donated for number of recipients of donation by type 
of traumatic event in Study 1. Group = four children; Single = individual recipient of 
donation. Est. = estimated.  
 
 
Research Question 3: Is There an Association Between Personal Trauma History 
and Number of Recipients That Impacts Willingness to Donate and Amount 
Donated?  
 There was not a significant interaction between number of recipients and personal 
trauma history (p = .355, two-tailed Fisher’s exact test, Cramer’s V = .115); see Figure 
11.  See Table 8 for means and standard deviations of amount donated for the number of 
recipients by type of traumatic event interaction.  After controlling for the effects of the 
covariates, the estimated means are shown in Table 9 and Figure 12.  There was not a 
significant interaction between number of recipients and trauma history on amount 
donated, F(2, 380) = 0.49, p = .613, ηp2 = .003.   
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Table 8.  Means and Standard Deviations of Amount Donated by Number of Recipients 
and Trauma History in Study 1. 
 Trauma History   
Number of Recipients None Lower Higher   
Single  19.27 (14.0) 21.52 (17.3) 17.97 (13.4)   
Group 18.29 (16.6) 20.10 (16.4) 19.84 (15.8)   
Note.  Standard deviations in parentheses.  N = 428.   
 
 
Table 9.  Estimated Means and Standard Errors of Amount Donated by Number of 
Recipients and Trauma History in Study 1. 
 Trauma History   
Number of Recipients None Lower Higher   
Single  19.83 (2.31) 19.72 (2.46) 17.34 (1.44)   
Group 19.49 (1.87) 21.11 (2.16) 20.33 (1.34)   
Note.  Standard errors in parentheses.  N = 428.   
 
 
 
Figure 11.  Percentage of participants willing to donate by number of recipients of 
donation and trauma history in Study 1. Higher = Higher betrayal trauma group; Lower = 
Lower betrayal trauma group; None = No betrayal trauma history. Group = four children; 
Single = individual recipient of donation.   
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Figure 12.  Estimated mean amount donated for number of recipients of donation by 
trauma history in Study 1. Higher = Higher betrayal trauma group; Lower = Lower 
betrayal trauma group; None = No betrayal trauma history. Group = four children; Single 
= individual recipient of donation.  Est. = estimated.  
 
 
Research Question 4: Is There an Association Between Personal Trauma History 
and Type of Event That Impacts Willingness to Donate and Amount Donated? 
 There was not a significant interaction between personal trauma history and type 
of traumatic event on willingness to donate (p = .276, two-tailed Fisher’s exact test, 
Cramer’s V = .151); see Figure 13.  When comparing the combined genocide term to the 
natural disaster condition with respect to trauma history, the interaction remains non-
significant, p = .389, two-tailed Fisher’s exact test, Cramer’s V = .116.   
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Figure 13.  Percentage of participants willing to donate by trauma history and type of 
traumatic event in Study 1.  Higher = Higher betrayal trauma group; Lower = Lower 
betrayal trauma group; None = No betrayal trauma history.  
  
 See Table 10 for means and standard deviations of amount donated for the 
interaction between type of event and trauma history.  After controlling for the effects of 
the covariates, the estimated means are shown in Table 11 and Figure 14.  There was not 
a significant interaction between personal trauma history and type of trauma on amount 
donated, F(4, 380) = 1.49, p = .205, ηp2 = .015; nor was there a significant interaction 
using the combined type of traumatic event variable, F(2, 391) = .563, p = .570, ηp2 = 
.003.   
 However, there was a significant 3-way interaction between number, type, and 
trauma history, F(4, 380) = 2.61, p = .035, ηp2 = .027.  See Tables 12 and 13 for means 
and Figures 15 and 16.  For the single recipient, there were no differences among the 
trauma groups for either genocide condition; however, in the natural disaster condition, 
those with a lower betrayal trauma donated more than the higher betrayal group (p = 
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.028).   When making donations to a group, the lower betrayal trauma group donated 
more than those with no trauma history to people experiencing an external genocide (p = 
.012).  No trauma group differences were found in the natural disaster condition or the 
internal genocide scenario.   
 
Table 10.  Means and Standard Deviations of Amount Donated by Type of Traumatic 
Event and Trauma History in Study 1. 
 Type of Traumatic Event   
Trauma History Group Natural Disaster 
External  
Genocide 
Internal  
Genocide 
 
 
None   19.62 (15.2) 15.42 (13.0) 21.30 (17.7)   
Lower  24.05 (18.7) 20.00 (14.5) 19.19 (16.9)   
Higher 19.64 (15.3) 20.31 (15.2) 17.44 (14.2)   
Note.  Standard deviations in parentheses.  N = 428.   
 
 
 
Table 11.  Estimated Means and Standard Errors of Amount Donated by Type of 
Traumatic Event and Trauma History in Study 1. 
 Type of Traumatic Event   
Trauma History Group Natural Disaster 
External  
Genocide 
Internal  
Genocide 
 
 
None   20.30 (3.00) 17.20 (2.04) 21.48 (17.7)   
Lower  23.34 (3.01) 21.02 (2.83) 16.88 (2.65)   
Higher 19.49 (2.05) 20.43 (1.52) 16.58 (1.59)   
Note.  Standard errors in parentheses.  N = 428.   
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Figure 14.  Estimated mean amount donated for trauma history by type of traumatic 
event in Study 1. Higher = Higher betrayal trauma group; Lower = Lower betrayal 
trauma group; None = No betrayal trauma history. Est. = estimated. 
 
 
Table 12.  Means and Standard Deviations of Amount Donated by Type of Traumatic 
Event and Trauma History for both Single and Group Recipients in Study 1. 
 Single  Group   
Trauma 
History 
Natural 
Disaster 
External 
Genocide 
Internal 
Genocide 
 Natural 
Disaster 
External 
Genocide 
Internal 
Genocide 
 
 
None 18.9 (9.16) 18.7 (14.8) 20.8 (17.6)  20.4 (19.8) 12.4 (10.6) 21.5 (17.9)   
Lower  30.5 (19.3) 14.6 (13.5) 19.6 (16.0)  17.0 (16.0) 24.6 (14.2) 19.0 (17.6)   
Higher 18.9 (15.0) 21.2 (14.4) 12.3 (7.76)  20.4 (15.8) 19.4 (16.1) 19.9 (15.9)   
Note.  Standard deviations in parentheses.  N = 428.   
 
Table 13.  Estimated Means and Standard Errors of Amount Donated by Type of 
Traumatic Event and Trauma History for both Single and Group Recipients in Study 1. 
 
Single  Group   
Trauma History Natural Disaster 
External 
Genocide 
Internal 
Genocide 
 Natural 
Disaster 
External 
Genocide 
Internal 
Genocide 
 
 
None 18.9 (4.05)b 19.3 (2.98) 21.3 (3.96)b 
 
21.7 (4.35) 15.1 (2.79) a 21.7 (2.33)   
Lower  30.0 (4.25)ab 14.9 (4.07) 14.3 (4.47) 
 
16.7 (4.41) 27.1 (3.89) a 19.5 (2.72)   
Higher 18.5 (2.83)a 20.6 (2.13) 12.9 (2.62)b 
 
20.5 (2.87) 20.2 (2.18) 20.3 (1.79)   
Note.  Standard errors in parentheses.  N = 428.  Within columns: a p < .05.  b p < .10. 
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Figure 15.  Estimated means of amount donated by type of traumatic event and trauma 
history for the single recipient of donation in Study 1. Higher = Higher betrayal trauma 
group; Lower = Lower betrayal trauma group; None = No betrayal trauma history. Est. = 
estimated.  
 
Figure 16.  Estimated means of amount donated by type of traumatic event and trauma 
history for the group of recipients of donation in Study 1. Higher = Higher betrayal 
trauma group; Lower = Lower betrayal trauma group; None = No betrayal trauma 
history. Est. = estimated. 
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Research Question 5: Is There an Interaction Between the Different Emotional 
Responses and Number of Recipients? 
 
 The emotional variables categorized based on quartile values to reduce the 
number of groups.  See Table 14 for quartile hinge values for each emotion. 
 
Table 14.  Percentile Values for Emotional Response Variables in Study 1. 
 Percentiles 
5 10 25 50 75 90 95 
Emotions 
Sad 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 7.00 
Sympathy 3.00 3.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 
Anger 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 7.00 7.00 
Guilty 1.00 2.00 3.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 7.00 
Betrayal 1.00 1.00 2.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 
 
 All of the emotions significantly interacted with number of recipients on 
willingness to donate: sad (p < .001, two-tailed Fisher’s exact test, Cramer’s V = .245), 
sympathy (p = .006, two-tailed Fisher’s exact test, Cramer’s V = .217), anger (p = .040, 
two-tailed Fisher’s exact test, Cramer’s V = .191), guilt (p < .001, two-tailed Fisher’s 
exact test, Cramer’s V = .324), and betrayal (p = .038, two-tailed Fisher’s exact test, 
Cramer’s V = .184).  For all the emotions, participants were less willing to donate to the 
group of recipients at lower levels of the emotions than expected.  See Figure 17.   
 There were no significant interactions for amount donated between number of 
recipients and feelings of: sadness, F(1, 380) = 0.23, p = .633, ηp2 = .001; sympathy, F(1, 
380) = 2.49, p = .115, ηp2 = .007; guilt, , F(1, 380) = 1.15, p = .285, ηp2 = .003; and 
betrayal, F(1, 380) = 0.82, p = .365, ηp2 = .001.  However, there was a significant 
interaction between number and anger, F(1, 380) = 5.32, p = .022, ηp2 = .014; see Figure 
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18.  Those donating to a group of recipients show steeper positive slope across emotion 
ratings compared to those who were donating to an individual.   
 
 
Figure 17.  Percentage of participants willing to donate by guilt ranking and number of 
recipients in Study 1. Group = four children; Single = individual recipient of donation.   
 
Research Question 6: Is There an Interaction Between the Different Emotional 
Responses and Type of Event? 
 There was not a significant interaction between type of event and feelings of 
anger on willingness to donate, p = .171, two-tailed Fisher’s exact test, Cramer’s V = 
.193.  Yet, there were significant interactions with the other emotions: sadness (p = .010, 
two-tailed Fisher’s exact test, Cramer’s V = .246), sympathy (p = .021, two-tailed 
Fisher’s exact test, Cramer’s V = .228), betrayal (p = .016, two-tailed Fisher’s exact test, 
Cramer’s V = .257) and guilt (p < .001, two-tailed Fisher’s exact test, Cramer’s V = .346).  
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 When comparing the natural disaster condition to the combined genocide 
conditions, the same pattern emerges (except for betrayal).  The interaction between 
betrayal rating and type was no longer significant when simply comparing the natural 
disaster condition to genocide, p = .218, two-tailed Fisher’s exact test, Cramer’s V = .153.  
As with the separated genocide conditions, there were significant interactions between 
type of event and sadness (p = .003, two-tailed Fisher’s exact test, Cramer’s V = .241), 
sympathy (p = .005, two-tailed Fisher’s exact test, Cramer’s V = .217), and guilt (p < 
.001, two-tailed Fisher’s exact test, Cramer’s V = .335); the interaction between anger 
and type remained non-significant, p = .062, two-tailed Fisher’s exact test, Cramer’s V = 
.185).  See Figure 19 for an example with the emotion guilt.  Thus, at low levels of 
sadness, sympathy, and guilt, people are less willing to donate to both the genocide 
conditions.  At lower levels of betrayal, people are less willing to donate to the internal 
genocide condition than expected.  See Figure 20.   
 
 
Figure 18.  Average amount donated by number of recipients across anger values in 
Study 1. Group = four children; Single = individual recipient of donation.   
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Figure 19.  Percentage of participants willing to donate by guilt ranking and type of event 
in Study 1.   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20.  Percentage of participants willing to donate by betrayal ranking and type of 
event in Study 1.   
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 Looking at the amount donated, there were no significant interactions for amount 
donated between type of event and emotional responses: sadness, F(2, 380) = 0.28, p = 
.757, ηp2 = .001; sympathy, F(2, 380) = 0.52, p = .593, ηp2 = .003; anger, F(2, 380) = 
0.57, p = .566, ηp2 = .003; guilt, , F(2, 380) = 0.06, p = .942, ηp2 < .001; and betrayal, F(2, 
380) = 0.30, p = .743, ηp2 = .002. 
 
Research Question 7: Is There an Interaction Between the Different Emotional 
Responses and Trauma History? 
 There was not a significant interaction between personal trauma history and levels 
of anger, p = .051, two-tailed Fisher’s exact test, Cramer’s V = .203.  However, the other 
emotions did significantly interact with trauma history on willingness to donate: 
sympathy (p = .003, two-tailed Fisher’s exact test, Cramer’s V = .248), sadness (p = < 
.001, two-tailed Fisher’s exact test, Cramer’s V = .267), guilt (p < .001, two-tailed 
Fisher’s exact test, Cramer’s V = .362), and betrayal (p = .041, two-tailed Fisher’s exact 
test, Cramer’s V = .209).  Those who experienced higher betrayal traumas were less 
willing to donate than expected at the lower levels of the emotions.  For guilt, this was 
also observed for those who had not experienced a betrayal trauma.  See Figure 21.   
 There were no significant interactions for amount donated between trauma history 
and emotional responses: sadness, F(2, 380) = 0.54, p = .584, ηp2 = .003; sympathy, F(2, 
380) = 0.21, p = .810, ηp2 = .001; anger, F(2, 380) = 1.17, p = .313, ηp2 = .006; guilt, , 
F(2, 380) = 0.41, p = .665, ηp2 = .002; and betrayal, F(2, 380) = 0.09, p = .918, ηp2 < .001. 
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Figure 21.  Percentage of participants willing to donate by guilt ranking and trauma 
history in Study 1. Higher = Higher betrayal trauma group; Lower = Lower betrayal 
trauma group; None = No betrayal trauma history. 
 
Follow-Up Analyses 
 A one-way MANOVA was run to determine if there were significant differences 
in emotional responses based on the number of recipients.  There was not a significant 
effect of number of recipients on emotional ratings, Wilk’s Λ = .988, F(5, 422) = 0.99, p = 
.426, multivariate η2 = .012.  The results of the univariate ANOVAs are: sadness, F(1, 
426) = 3.51, p = .062, η2 = .008; sympathy, F(1, 426) = 0.45, p = .502, η2 = .001; anger, 
F(1, 426) = 2.05, p = .153, η2 =.005; guilt, F(1, 426) = 1.79, p = .182, η2 = .004; and 
betrayal, F(1, 426) = 0.89, p = .346, η2 =.002.   
 To determine if personal trauma history was associated with different levels of 
emotional responses, a one-way MANOVA was run.  There was not a significant effect 
of trauma history on emotional ratings, Roy’s Largest Root = 0.02, F(5, 422) = 1.86, p = 
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.100, multivariate η2 = .022.  The results of the univariate ANOVAs are: sadness, F(2, 
425) = 0.78, p = .459, η2 = .004; sympathy, F(2, 425) = 0.14, p = .870, η2 = .001; anger, 
F(2, 425) = 1.33, p = .265, η2 =.006; guilt, F(2, 425) = 0.30, p = .744, η2 = .001; and 
betrayal, F(2, 425) = 2.04, p = .132, η2 =.010.   
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION – STUDY 1 
 The purpose of this study was to explore further how trauma-related variables 
may be associated with helping behavior utilizing a betrayal trauma framework.  Previous 
research (Frazier et al., 2012) demonstrated that people with a trauma history engaged in 
more daily helping behaviors and volunteer work.  Utilizing a charitable donation 
paradigm, the hypothesis that trauma increases prosocial behavior was not supported; 
there not a significant difference in willingness to donate or in the amount donated across 
betrayal trauma backgrounds.  Interestingly, the higher betrayal trauma group was less 
likely to donate at lower levels of sympathy, sadness, guilt, and betrayal.  Therefore, 
people with a high betrayal trauma history needed to be more emotionally activated to be 
willing to donate.   
 This study also examined how charitable behavior may differ based on the 
betrayal level of the traumatic event.  Work by Zagefka and colleagues (2011; 2012) 
showed that people reliably will offer less aid to survivors of humanly caused disasters.  
However, this study did not replicate their work.  Participants were just as willing to 
donate and donated approximately the same amount to the genocide conditions as they 
did to the natural disaster.  However, people were less willing to donate to the genocide 
conditions at low levels of the various emotions than expected.  Thus, the genocide 
condition required a higher level of emotional reaction to receive the same amount of 
support as those suffering from a natural disaster.   
 Yet, there was a significant interaction between number of recipients, type of 
traumatic event, and personal trauma history on amount donated.  The number of 
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recipients and the type of event differentially influenced people with a lower betrayal 
trauma history.  When donating to a single survivor, the lower betrayal group donated the 
most to people who experienced a natural disaster.  However, when presented with a 
group of survivors, they donated the most to the external genocide condition.   
 Looking at the effects of the emotions, interesting findings were obtained.  Only 
sympathy and guilt were directly associated with a greater willingness to donate and 
larger amounts donated.  Surprisingly, anger was positively, rather than negatively, 
associated with charitable behavior, although there was not a significant main effect once 
the other emotional responses were taken into account.  This may have occurred because 
anger has been shown to activate an approach motivational system (Carver & Harmon-
Jones, 2009).  Haidt (2003) suggests anger is a moral emotion that can act as motivation 
to redress perceived injustices with prosocial behavior.  Indeed, the contempt-anger-
disgust (CAD) triad hypothesis proposed by Rozin, Lowery, Imada, and Haidt (1999) 
links anger with violations of individual rights.  Research by Vitaglione and Barnett 
(2003) demonstrated that “empathic anger” on behalf of a suffering person increased 
desire to help.  This was observed in the study in that people donated more money to the 
individual than the group at a greater magnitude when experiencing anger.   
 Analyses revealed there was no significant variation in emotional responses for 
the type of events (except for betrayal), trauma history, and number of recipients.  This 
may explain the lack of observed group differences.  Previous research (e.g., Dickert, 
Sagara, & Slovic, 2011; Small et al., 2007) has suggested the importance of emotional 
reactions in prosocial decision-making.  If there are no differences in emotional reactions, 
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there is unlikely to be behavioral differences.  For this reason, a repeated-measures 
design was used in Study 2.   
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CHAPTER VI 
INTRODUCTION – STUDY 2 
 Study 2 was designed to build upon the findings of Study 1 and hopefully address 
some of the limitations found during that experiment.  Two major advantages of this 
study were utilizing a repeated-measures design and incorporating additional correlates of 
prosocial behavior.   
Added Constructs 
Perceived Impact of Donation 
 Given the research previously discussed highlighting the salience of the 
proportion of lives saved rather than the absolute number on donation decision-making 
(e.g., Slovic, 2007), this suggests people are evaluating the impact their donation may 
have before deciding.  That is, people will be more likely to, and will donate more, when 
they believe their donation can make a difference.  Cheung and Chan (2000) showed that 
outcome efficacy (i.e., “the IRO [international relief organization] can help people more 
effectively than other overseas relief organizations”) was directly predictive of donation 
intent to the IRO.   Research using donation paradigms with vignettes have also found 
significant effects of perceived impact for likelihood of donation (Zagefka et al., 2012) 
and donation amounts (Dickert, Kleber, Peters, & Slovic, 2011)  
Personality Characteristics 
 Conceptualizing personality using the Five Factor Model of personality (FFM; see 
McCrae & John, 1992; John, Naumann, & Soto, 2008), associations between the five 
factors (i.e., openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and emotional 
stability) and prosocial behaviors have been explored.  Work by Levy, Freitas, and 
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Salovey (2002) showed that higher levels of openness to experience related to increased 
donations to a local homeless shelter.  Emotional stability and extraversion have been 
associated with increased charitable donations (Bekkers, 2006).  Using a sample of 
college students, Kosek (1995) found positive correlations between extraversion, 
openness, and agreeableness with total prosocial behavior. 
 It appears that the factors with the most empirical support for a link with prosocial 
behavior are extraversion and agreeableness.  Elshaug and Metzer (2001) showed that 
volunteers and paid workers differed on ratings of agreeableness and extraversion.  
Addition research has also found associations among extraversion, agreeableness, and 
volunteering (Carlo, Okun, Knight, de Guzman, 2005; Frazier et al., 2012).  A study by 
Caprara, Alessandri, Di Giunta, Panerai, and Eisenberg (2010) demonstrated 
agreeableness played a “major role” in predicting self-reported prosocial behavior.  
Follow-up work by those researchers supported their hypothesis that agreeableness 
compared to the other personality traits is a strong predictor of prosociality (Caprara, 
Alessandri, & Eisenberg, 2012).    
Trait Empathy 
 Empathy is “an affective state that stems from the apprehension of another’s 
emotional state of condition, and that is congruent with it” (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987, p. 
91).  However, there is some agreement now that empathy consists of both an affective 
and a cognitive component (de Waal, 2008; Smith, 2006).  Trait empathy has been shown 
to be positively associated with various prosocial behaviors, such as voluntarism (Penner 
& Finkelstein, 1998; Penner, 2002; Unger & Thumuluri, 1997) and helping behaviors 
(Conway, Rogelberg, & Pitts, 2009; Wilhelm & Bekkers, 2010).  It has also predicted 
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charitable giving, both for the decision to donate and amount donated (Davis, 1983; 
Bekkers 2006; Verhaert & Van den Poel, 2011).  While it is a well-documented 
association, a meta-analysis by Eisenberg and Miller (1987) describes the association 
between empathy and prosocial behavior as low to moderate. 
Social Value Orientation 
 Social value orientation (SVO) reflects individual differences in how decision 
makers prioritize self versus other when distributing resources (see Bogaert, Boone, & 
Declerck, 2008 for a review).  There are two general categories of orientation style, 
prosocial and proself.  The proself grouping is further subdivided into two types, 
resulting in three social value orientations: cooperative/prosocial, individualistic, and 
competitive.  A person with a cooperative/prosocial orientation will try to maximize 
outcomes for both self and other, while those with either the individualistic or 
competitive orientations will try to maximize outcomes for self either a) without respect 
to the “other” (i.e., greatest absolute value) or b) relative to the “other” (i.e., greatest 
difference value), respectively.   
 Much of the research on social value orientation has been conducted using social 
dilemma games.  A recent meta-analysis revealed a small to medium effect size between 
social value orientation and cooperation, showing that prosocials cooperate more than 
proselfs and individualists more than competitors (Balliet, Parks, & Joireman, 2009).  
There has been limited research beyond social dilemma tasks associating a prosocial 
value orientation with prosocial behavior, such as agreeing to volunteer and charitable 
donations.  McClintock and Allison (1989) reported that prosocials agreed to volunteer 
more hours than the proself orientations.  Prosocial value orientation was associated with 
 58 
increased donation amounts (Bekkers 2006).  Further research by Van Lange, Bekkers, 
Schuyt, and Vugt (2007) found that prosocials had more acts of donation (i.e., different 
types of donations) and donated to greater number of organizations than the proself 
groups, especially to organizations providing aid to the poor and ill.  While the proself 
groups did not differ in terms of the number of donations, individualists donated to a 
wider variety of organizations than competitors.   
Prosocial Tendencies 
 Prosociality refers to “individuals’ enduring tendencies to enact behaviors such as 
sharing, helping, caring, and empathy” (Caprara et al., 2012, p. 1289).  Thus, it is 
describing dispositional prosocial behavior.  Prosociality has been linked to both 
agreeableness and trait empathy (Caprara et al., 2010); however, this is the first study to 
directly examine how it relates to a behavioral measure of helping. 
Emotion Regulation 
 “Emotion regulation is the process by which activation in one response domain 
[neurophysiological-biochemical, motor-expressive, experiential-cognitive] serves to 
alter, titrate, or modulate activation in another response domain” (Dodge, 1989, p. 340).  
Previous research has shown that people may actively avoid emotions (e.g., empathy) 
that will motivate them to provide help (Shaw, Batson, & Todd, 1994).  As previously 
mentioned, Cameron and Payne (2011) demonstrated how this might explain the collapse 
of compassion, particularly by people who are skilled in emotion regulation.   
 Two commonly used emotion regulation strategies are cognitive reappraisal and 
expressive suppression (Gross & John, 2003).  Cognitive reappraisal consists of thinking 
about the situation in a way that changes its emotional impact; with suppression, the 
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person inhibits his or her behavioral emotional reactions, such as keeping a poker face.  
Rubaltelli and Agnoli (2012) found that suppression was associated with choosing to 
donate to one woman (and thus providing a lower donation), whereas cognitive 
reappraisal was associated with supporting the program serving three women (and 
requiring a larger donation).   
Social Desirability 
 Socially desirable responding is the tendency, either purposeful or unconscious, to 
answer items in a way that makes the respondent look “good” (Vispoel & Tao, 2012).  
Hardy (2006) found social desirability was associated with empathy and prosocial 
behavior.  In a study exploring sympathy and distress on prosocial behavior, both self-
reported emotional responses positively correlated with social desirability (Eisenberg, 
Fabes, et al., 1989).  It has also been shown to predict willingness to provide help and 
donation behavior (Marjanovic, Struthers, & Greenglass, 2012).  Because charitable 
giving can be considered a socially desirable action, it is possible participants may give 
artificially elevated prosocial responses.   
Betrayal Awareness 
 Betrayal blindness refers to the lack of awareness and forgetting people exhibit 
towards betrayal (Freyd, 1996).  While Gobin and Freyd (2009) did not find significant 
differences in overall betrayal awareness across trauma backgrounds, they did find that 
persons with a high betrayal trauma history had higher betrayal blindness for partner 
infidelity in romantic relationships.  This is the first study to look at betrayal awareness 
using a behavioral measure of giving.   
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Summary of Purposes and Goals 
 Given the lack of differences observed between the scenarios in Study 1, the 
research design was changed to a repeated-measures approach in an effort to increase 
variability between the types of events.  Participants were now presented with both types 
of scenarios, which allowed the use of difference scores as the unit of analysis.  This 
approach also removes the effects of individual differences in the repeated variables.  
New to this study was the creation of scenarios reflecting varying betrayal levels of each 
type of event.  As in Study 1, there were two versions of a genocide event: internal (high) 
and external (low).  However, now two versions of the natural disaster were used: the 
flood was caused because of either heavy rain (low) or a poorly built bridge collapsed 
(high).  Additionally, known correlates of charitable behavior were incorporated to 
reduce unexplained variance and increase the likelihood of finding significant effects.  
The goal remains the same as Study 1: to explore charitable behavior using a betrayal 
trauma framework.   
Hypotheses and Research Questions 
! Hypothesis 1: Willingness to donate and amount donated will be higher for the 
single, identified survivor.   
! Hypothesis 2: Increased affect will be associated with greater willingness to 
donate and higher donation amounts; however, perceived betrayal would show a 
negative association.   
! Hypothesis 3: Persons of a prosocial value orientation will donate more money. 
! Hypothesis 4: Persons with increased agreeableness and extraversion will be more 
willing to donate and will donate more money. 
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! Hypothesis 5: People with higher social desirability will be more willing to donate 
and report higher donation amounts. 
! Hypothesis 6: People who use suppression as an emotion regulation will report 
lower donation amounts, while those who use reappraisal will report higher 
amounts. 
! Hypothesis 7: More empathetic people will be more willing to donate and report 
higher donation amounts. 
! Hypothesis 8: Participants with higher prosocial scores will be more willing to 
donate and will donate more money. 
! Hypothesis 9: Participants with lower betrayal awareness will be more willing to 
donate and will provide more money. 
! Hypothesis 10: People will be more willing to donate, and donate more, to the 
flood condition than to the genocide condition. 
! Hypothesis 11: People will be more willing to donate, and donate more, to the 
lower betrayal condition than to the higher betrayal condition. 
! Hypothesis 12: Lower betrayal awareness will be associated with higher 
donations to a) the natural disaster condition and b) the lower betrayal conditions. 
! Research Question 1: Does personal history of betrayal trauma relate to charitable 
donations in regards to willingness to donate as well as amount donated?  
! Research Question 2: Is there an association between personal trauma history and 
number of recipients that impacts willingness to donate and amount donated? 
! Research Question 3: Is there an interaction between the different emotional 
responses and number of recipients?   
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! Research Question 4: Is there an interaction between the different emotional 
responses and trauma history? 
! Research Question 5: Are there interactions between the different emotional 
responses and social value orientation? 
! Research Question 6: Is there an association between personal trauma history and 
type of event that impacts willingness to donate and amount donated? 
! Research Question 7: Is there an association between personal trauma history and 
level of betrayal of event that relates to amount donated? 
! Research Question 8: Do differences in emotional responses predict differences in 
donations to the genocide and flood conditions? 
! Research Question 9: Do differences in emotional responses predict differences in 
donations to the high and low betrayal levels?    
! Research Question 10: Does the number of recipients produce differences in a) 
donations to the two types of scenarios or b) donations to the two betrayal levels? 
! Research Question 11: Does the effect of differences in emotional responses vary 
across trauma backgrounds producing differences in a) donations to the two types 
of scenarios or b) donations to the two betrayal levels?  
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CHAPTER VII 
METHOD – STUDY 2 
Participants 
 The sample consisted of 634 undergraduate students (69.4% women) recruited 
from the Human Subjects Pool at the University of Oregon.  Ages of participants ranged 
from 18 to 52 (M=19.7, SD= 2.59).  Approximately 72% of the sample identified solely 
as Caucasian and 93% identified as heterosexual; the most frequently endorsed religious 
affiliation was “other” (49.5%).  Participants were recruited online with a blinded study 
registration process based on time availability to minimize self-selection bias.  
Participants earned research credit for a course requirement by completing some or all of 
the survey.  Unique identification numbers were given to respondents to ensure 
anonymity.  All variables had 3.6% or less missing data; however, only 361 of 
participants had complete data.  Missing data for items within a scale or subscale (except 
for betrayal awareness) were replaced with individual mean values if either a) only 1 item 
was unanswered or b) if at least 90% of the items were answered.  Less than 1% (n = 3) 
of original participants experienced none of the betrayal awareness events; therefore, 
because betrayal awareness could not be assessed, they were removed from the sample.  
Listwise deletion was used to handle any remaining missing data, resulting in a sample 
size of 513 participants. 
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Materials 
 
Demographics Questionnaire 
 Demographic information was collected regarding gender, ethnicity, age, 
religious affiliation, and sexual orientation.  The principal investigator for this study 
created the questions.   
Big Five Inventory 
 Personality was measured using the Big Five Inventory (BFI; John, Donahue, & 
Kentle, 1991).  Comprised of 44 items, this is a self-report measure of the Big Five 
personality traits: openness (10 items; e.g., “is creative and inventive”), conscientiousness 
(9 items; e.g., “is a reliable worker”), extraversion (8 items; e.g., “is talkative”), 
agreeableness (9 items; e.g., “has a forgiving nature”), and emotional stability (8 items 
e.g., “can be tense”).  Participants rated each short phrase on a 5-point Likert scale from 
strongly disagree to strongly agree.  Scores were averaged across subscale items.  John 
and Srivastava (1999) reported alpha reliabilities from .75 to .80 for the 5 subscales and 
3-month test-retest reliabilities from .80 to .90.  In this study, all 5 subscales had 
acceptable to good internal consistency: agreeableness (α = .78), conscientiousness (α = 
.79), emotional stability (α = .83), extraversion (α = .87), and openness (α = .81). 
Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding 
 The Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR-6; Paulhus, 1991) is a 
40-item social desirability measure consisting of 2 subscales: self-deceptive 
enchancement (SDE) and impression management (IM).  The self-deception subscale 
looks at the person’s tendency to accentuate positive, while minimizing negative, 
attributes.  The impression management subscale assesses deliberate self-presentation to 
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others regarding performing desirable behaviors more frequently than undesirable 
actions.  Participants indicated their level of agreement with each item on a 7-point scale 
(not true to very true).  Typically, dichotomous scoring is used such that only extreme 
scores (i.e., 6 or 7) are summed, creating a range of values from 0 to 20 per subscale.  
Paulhus (1991) reported good internal consistency for all 40 items (Cronbach’s α = .83), 
with αs ranging from .68 to .80 for the SDE subscale and .75 to .86 for the IM subscale; 
high test-retest reliability over a 5-week period has been also been demonstrated for both 
SDE (r = .69) and IM (r = .65).  Comparing a continuous scoring method to the 
traditional dichotomous method, Stöber, Dette, & Musch (2002) found that the 
continuous approach produced higher Cronbach alpha coefficients and better convergent 
validity with other measures of social desirability.  For this study, using a continuous 
scoring method, Cronbach’s alpha was acceptable for both SDE (α = .69) and IM (α = 
.76), with a full-scale internal consistency of α = .78.   
Triple-Dominance Measure of Social Value Orientation  
 The 9-item Triple-Dominance Measure of Social Value Orientation (TDMSVO; 
see Van Lange, De Bruin, Otten, & Joireman, 1997) assesses a respondent’s social value 
orientation.  The TDMSVO is structured such that each participant selects among three 
alternative allocations of valuable points for himself or herself and the “other”.  Each of 
the allocations corresponds to either a cooperative/prosocial, individualistic, or 
competitive orientation.  The measure’s instructions provide the following example (with 
orientation type provided in parentheses for reference): 500 for both (prosocial), 550 to 
self and 300 for other (individualistic), or 500 to self and 100 for other (competitive).  
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Participants are classified as having a particular social value orientation if they 
consistently select one orientation style for at least 67% of the items.   
 A review by Au and Kwong (2004) determined that more people are classified as 
having a prosocial orientation (median = 46%) than the proself orientations of 
individualistic (median = 25%) and competitive (median = 13%).  The median 
unclassified rate was 12%.  Murphy, Ackermann, and Handgraaf (2011) demonstrated 
good test-rest reliability and convergent validity for this measure.  Approximately 70% of 
participants were classified as having the same SVO at two different time periods 
(Goodman and Kruskal’s gamma = 0.391).  Additionally, Murphy and colleagues (2011) 
showed classification agreement with two other SVO measures, the Ring Measure (67%) 
and the Slider Measure (74%).    
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire 
 The Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & John, 2003) is a 10-item 
self-report measure consisting of two scales reflecting different emotion regulation 
strategies: cognitive reappraisal (six items) and expressive suppression (four items).  An 
example reappraisal item is “I control my emotions by changing the way I think about the 
situation I’m in” while “I control my emotions by not expressing them” demonstrates 
suppression.  The 10 items were rated on a 7-point-Likert scale from strongly disagree to 
strongly agree.  Scores were averaged across subscale items.  The ERQ has been shown 
to have both acceptable internal consistency (α = .79 for the reappraisal subscale and α = 
.73 for the suppression subscale) and a 2-month test-retest reliability of .69 (Gross & 
John, 2003).  This study’s Cronbach’s alpha for both subscales were adequate with alphas 
of .72 and .83 for suppression and reappraisal, respectively.   
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Interpersonal Reactivity Index  
 Davis’s (1980, 1983) Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) is a 28-item measure that 
consists of four subscales: empathic concern (EC), fantasy (FS), personal distress (PD), 
and perspective taking (PT).  The EC subscale measures a person’s feelings of sympathy 
and compassion for others (e.g., “I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less 
fortunate than I am”).  Fantasy refers to a person’s ability to transpose oneself into 
fictional situations (e.g., “I really get involved with the feelings of the characters in a 
novel”).  The PD subscale looks at the person’s tendency to respond with distress to 
stressful situations experienced by others (e.g.  “I sometimes feel helpless when I am in 
the middle of a very emotional situation”).  Lastly, the PT subscale assesses a person’s 
inclination to adopt another person’s point of views spontaneously (e.g., “I sometimes try 
to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their perspective”).  
The measure provides five response options ranging from does not describe me well to 
describes me very well.  Scores are summed across all items for a measure of trait 
empathy.  The subscales also have acceptable internal consistency (range = .71 to .77) 
and test-retest reliabilities (range = .62 to .80) (Davis, 1980).  The whole scale had a good 
Cronbach’s alpha (α = .82), as did all the subscales (αs = .77 to .78).   
Prosocialness Scale for Adults  
 Participants completed a 16-item scale to assess prosocial feelings and behaviors 
associated with four types of actions: sharing, helping, caring for, and responding 
empathetically to others’ needs (Caprara, Steca, Zelli, & Capanna, 2005).  For each item, 
respondents indicated the veracity of each statement on a 5-point Likert scale (never true 
to almost always true).  Scores were averaged across all items.  The scale has shown high 
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internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .91; Caprara et al., 2005).  A follow-up study by 
Caprara et al. (2012) demonstrated both excellent internal consistency (Time 1α = .93, 
Time 2α = .94) and test-rest reliability (r = .72).  For this study, Cronbach’s alpha was 
.90.   
Betrayal Detection Measure 
 To look at betrayal blindness tendencies in general, participations completed a 
shortened version of a betrayal detection scale developed by Gobin and Freyd (2009).  
The original scale included seven items, each consisting of three parts, that looked at 
romantic, emotional, and social betrayals committed by family members, friends, and 
romantic partners.  The first part of each question asks how often the participant has 
experienced a similar betrayal to the one presented in the scenario (from never to more 
than 100 times).  The second part looks at the participant’s awareness of the betrayal, 
ranging from completely unaware (a score of 1) to completely aware (a score of 5).  In 
the final section, participants indicate their reaction to the similar betrayal event they 
experienced.   Response options assessed two components: whether they a) confronted 
(or not) the person and b) continued the relationship (or ended it).  Gobin and Freyd 
(2009) reported adequate internal consistency of level of awareness for both support-
related (r = .27) and betrayals in an intimate relationship (r = .50).  In this study, only 5 
items were used (i.e., the romantic partner items have been removed) and only the first 
two parts of each item were asked (i.e., not asking about their behavioral responses).  
Scores were averaged across all items that respondents endorsed experiencing at least 
once.  For this study, Cronbach’s alpha was .63, with inter-item correlations ranging from 
.09 to .46.   
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Brief Betrayal Trauma Survey 
 A modified version of the Brief Betrayal Trauma Survey (BBTS; Goldberg & 
Freyd, 2006) was used in this study.  For each question, participants selected whether 
they had experienced each of the betrayal events for 3 different time periods: before the 
age of 12, between the ages of 12 and 17, and after the age of 18.  Also, respondents 
checked yes or no that the event happened rather than indicating how frequently each 
item occurred.   
Charitable Behavior Vignettes 
 Charitable behavior was measured using 8 vignettes (adapted from Small et al., 
2007), representing two events.  Event 1 is a natural disaster (i.e., a flood) and Event 2 is 
genocide.  Within each event, there were two versions reflecting a lower or a higher 
betrayal level of the event.  Within the flood condition, the flood was caused either by 
heavy rain (a lower betrayal) or a poorly build dam collapsing (a higher betrayal).  Within 
the genocide condition, the persons attacking were either from outside the village (a 
lower betrayal) or within the village (a higher betrayal).  As with Study 1, the donation 
was made to either a single child or a group of 4 children.  Participants were randomly 
assigned to a condition consisting of two vignettes of the flood or genocide scenarios that 
differed in betrayal level.  The order of the scenarios was counterbalanced.  They were 
given a hypothetical $100, the vignettes and photos, and asked the amount to be donated 
to each scenario.  They also indicated how much money they would like to keep for 
themselves.  The sum of the three responses could not total more than 100.  Participants 
also reported their emotional responses on a 7-point rating scale (not at all to very much) 
for the emotions of sadness, sympathy and compassion, anger, guilt, and perceived 
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betrayal of event.  Additionally, they completed a question regarding their belief in the 
effectiveness of a donation to the situation on a 7-point rating scale (“not at all” to “very 
much”). 
Procedure 
 Human subjects approval was granted by Office for the Protection of Human 
Subjects at the University of Oregon prior to data collection.  Measures were completed 
online via Qualtrics, an Internet-based survey program.  The average time to complete the 
study was approximately 35 minutes.  After providing informed consent, participants 
answered basic demographic questions.  The order of presentation for the self-report 
measures was: the BFI, the BIDR, the Triple-Dominance Measure of Social Value 
Orientation, the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire, the IRI, the Prosocial Measure, the 
Betrayal Detection Measure, and the BBTS.  When finished with the self-report 
measures, participants were randomly presented with the two charitable donation 
vignettes and questions.  All participants were provided with an electronic version of the 
debriefing form onscreen available for downloading. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
RESULTS – STUDY 2 
 Overall, 93% of the sample (n = 478) made a hypothetical donation, leaving a 
small sample size (n = 35) of those who did not donate.  The average total amount 
donated was 65.7 (SD =32.7).  The mean amounts donated to each scenario were: high 
betrayal genocide scenario (M = 34.8, SD = 17.9, SE = 1.11), high betrayal flood (M = 
30.7, SD = 17.5, SE = 1.10), low betrayal genocide (M = 33.9, SD = 20.1, SE = 1.27), and 
low betrayal flood (M = 31.8, SD = 16.6, SE = 1.03).  See Figure 22.  Multivariate tests 
revealed significant differences among these means, Wilk’s Λ = .961, F(1, 511) = 20.9, p 
< .001, multivariate η2 = .039.  People donated significantly more money to the high 
betrayal genocide condition than both the high and low betrayal flood conditions, p = 
.009 and p = .001, respectively.  Donations were also higher for the low betrayal 
genocide condition compared to the high betrayal flood scenario, p = .001.  However, 
there were significant order effects, so results should be interpreted cautiously.      
 
Figure 22.  Estimated mean donation amounts for each scenario in Study 2. Low = low 
betrayal; High = high betrayal. Est. = estimated. Error bars represent standard errors.  
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Order Effects 
 
 There was not a significant difference in total amounts donated based on whether 
the participant was first presented the flood condition (estimated M = 61.0, SE = 2.35) or 
the genocide condition (estimated M = 64.5, SE = 2.46), F(1, 377) = 1.58, p = .209, ηp2 = 
.004.  However, there was a significant order effect for betrayal level of the event on total 
amount donated, F(1, 377) = 9.94, p = .002, ηp2 = .026; overall, people donated more 
money when presented first with the lower betrayal event (estimated M = 67.2, SE = 
2.42) than with the higher betrayal event (estimated M = 58.3, SE = 2.40).  The 
interaction between the two order effects was not significant, F(1, 377) = 0.46, p = .500, 
ηp2 = .001.   
 When comparing donation amounts for the genocide and flood conditions, there 
was a significant order effect for type of scenario, F(1, 477) = 4.78, p = .029, ηp2 = .010.  
When presented with the flood condition first, people donated on average 32.4 (SE = 
1.26) to the genocide condition and 31.3 (SE = 1.14) to the flood condition.  However, 
when presented with the genocide condition first, people donated on average 35.2 (SE = 
1.28) to the genocide condition and 31.1 (SE = 1.15) to the flood condition.  Thus, the 
magnitude of the donation difference between genocide and flood conditions was larger 
when presented with the genocide condition first.  There was not a significant order effect 
for presentation of betrayal level on type donations, F(1, 477) = 0.89, p = .345, ηp2 = 
.002, nor for the interaction between the two order effects, F(1,477) = 0.89, p = .345, ηp2 
= .002.  The influence of the order of presentation did not significantly vary across 
personal trauma history: the type order effect, F(2, 477) = 0.03, p = .973, ηp2 < .001; the 
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betrayal order effect, F(2, 477) = 0.56, p = .574, ηp2 = .002; or the interaction of the order 
effects, F(2, 477) = 0.78, p = .461, ηp2 = .003. 
 Looking at donation amounts for the high and low betrayal conditions, the order 
effect for type of event was not significant on donations to the betrayal conditions, F(1, 
477) = 0.37, p = .544, ηp2 = .001.  However, there was a significant order effect for 
betrayal level, F(1, 477) = 4.93, p = .027, ηp2 = .010.  People donated on average 33.1 (SE 
= 1.20) to the high condition and 34.7 (SE = 1.23) to the low condition when presented 
with the low condition first.  However, when presented with the high betrayal condition 
first, people donated on average 31.9 (SE = 1.19) to the high condition and 30.3 (SE = 
1.22) to the low condition.  Thus, people donated more to the level of betrayal with which 
they were first presented.  The interaction between the order effects was also significant, 
F(1, 477) = 11.5, p = .001, ηp2 = .024; see Figure 23.  Donations for the high genocide 
condition did not vary whether the scenario was shown before or after the low flood 
condition.  However, for the other three conditions, donations increased if the low 
betrayal scenario was displayed first, as most markedly seen in the low genocide 
condition.  That is, donations to the low genocide condition were higher if it preceded the 
high flood scenario but lower if it followed the high flood scenario.  Persons of varying 
trauma history were not influenced differentially by the type order effect, F(2, 477) = 
0.18, p = .837, ηp2 = .001; the betrayal order effect, F(2, 477) = 0.08, p = .921, ηp2 < .001; 
nor the interaction of the two order effects, F(2, 477) = 1.28, p = .278, ηp2 = .005.  
Because these effects were significant, they were included in the model.   
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Figure 23.  Estimated mean donation amounts for each scenario by first condition 
presented in Study 2. Low = low betrayal; High = high betrayal. Est. = estimated. Error 
bars represent standard errors.  
 
  
Hypotheses and Research Questions 
Hypothesis 1: Willingness to Donate and Amount Donated Will Be Higher for the 
Single, Identified Survivor.   
 There was not an association between number of recipients and willingness to 
donate, χ2 (1, N = 513) = 0.10, p = .747, ϕ = .014.  The average total amount donated to 
the single recipient was 64.8 (SD = 33.0, SE = 2.09), while the average amount donated 
to the group was 66.5 (SD = 32.4, SE =1.99).  After controlling for the effects of the 
covariates, the mean estimated amount donated to the single recipient was 61.9 (SE = 
2.75) and 63.7 (SE = 2.73) for the group of children; see Figure 24.  This was not a 
significant difference, F(1, 377) = 0.11, p = .744, ηp2 < .001.   
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Figure 24. Estimated mean donation amounts by number of recipients in Study 2. Est. = 
estimated. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Increased Affect Will Be Associated With Greater Willingness to 
Donate and Higher Donation Amounts; However, Perceived Betrayal Would Show a 
Negative Association.   
 Point-biserial correlations revealed positive linear trends for all emotional 
variables on willingness to donate: sadness, r(511) = .337, p < .001, r2 = .114; sympathy, 
r(511) = .302, p < .001, r2 = .091; anger, r(511) = .278, p < .001, r2 = .077; betrayal, 
r(511) = .169, p < .001, r2 = .029; guilt, r(511) = .475, p < .001, r2 = .226; and perceived 
impact of donation, r(511) = .429, p < .001, r2 = .184.  After controlling for the effects of 
the other variables, increased willingness to donate was only associated with increased 
ratings of: anger, r(506) = .090, p = .042, r2 = .008; guilt, r(506) = .253, p < .001, r2 = 
.064; and impact of donation, r(506) = .185, p < .001, r2 = .034.    
 Table 15 shows the means and standard deviations for the total amount donated 
and the mean emotional response variables; it also includes the correlations among these 
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variables.  See Figure 25 for a plot of the mean amounts donated by emotional response 
values.  All emotional response variables were significantly positively correlated with 
amount donated, ps < .01.   
 
 
Table 15.  Correlations among Emotional Response Variables and Total Amount 
Donated in Study 2. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1.  Amount -       
2.  Sad .366** -      
3.  Sympathy .349** .823** -     
4.  Anger .300** .619** .603** -    
5.  Betrayal .285** .409** .390** .609** -   
6.  Guilt .453** .503** .501** .387** .287** -  
7.  Impact .480** .459** .474** .303** .277** .620** - 
Mean 65.6 5.39 5.71 4.95 4.42 4.91 4.98 
Standard deviation 32.7 1.33 1.18 1.48 1.48 1.93 1.73 
        
Note.  ** p < .01 
 
 
Figure 25.  Average amount donated by emotional response ratings in Study 2.    
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 After controlling for the effects of the covariates, only guilt and belief in the 
donation making a difference significantly predicted amount donated, such that increased 
feelings of guilt (p = .001) and a perceived higher impact (p = .023) were associated with 
higher donation amounts.   See Table 16 for the results of the F-tests.   
 
Table 16.  Results of Emotional Responses Predicting Amount Donated in Study 2.   
Source SS df MS F p ηp2 
Sad 39.6 1 39.6 0.05 .819 <.001 
Sympathy 645.5 1 645.5 0.86 .355 .002 
Anger 41.1 1 41.1 0.06 .815 <.001 
Betrayal 863.3 1 863.3 1.15 .285 .003 
Guilty 8197.2 1 8197.2     10.9 .001 .028  
Impact 3909.8 1 3909.8 5.20 .023 .014 
Error 283565.6 377 752.2    
Corrected Total 475435.3 444     
 
 
Research Question 1: Does Personal History of Betrayal Trauma Relate to 
Charitable Donations in Regards to Willingness to Donate as Well as Amount 
Donated? 
 Of the sample, 59% (n = 304) experienced a betrayal trauma; 46.4% (n = 238) 
endorsed at least one lower betrayal item and 39.4% (n = 202) survived a higher betrayal 
event.  As in Study 1, three groups were created to represent trauma history: none (n = 
209), lower betrayal (n = 102), and higher betrayal (n = 202).  Of those with no trauma 
history, 93.8% made a donation; similarly, 93.1% of the lower — and 92.6% of the 
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higher — betrayal trauma groups donated.  There was not an association between 
personal trauma history and willingness to donate, χ2 (2, N = 513) = 0.24, p = .889, 
Cramer’s V = .021.   
 The mean total amounts donated by trauma history: no betrayal history group (M 
= 68.0, SD = 31.9, SE = 2.20), lower betrayal group (M =63.6, SD = 33.2, SE = 3.29), and 
higher betrayal group (M =64.2, SD = 33.2, SE = 2.34).  After controlling for the effects 
of the covariates, the average amounts donated by the groups became: the no betrayal 
history group (M =62.4, SE = 2.80), lower betrayal group (M =65.6, SE = 4.26), and 
higher betrayal group (M =60.2, SE = 2.89); see Figure 26.  There was not a significant 
main effect of betrayal trauma history on total amount donated, F(2, 377) = 0.20, p = 
.817, ηp2 = .001.   
 
 
Figure 26.  Estimated mean amount donated by history of betrayal trauma in Study 2. 
None = no betrayal trauma history; Lower = history of at least one lower betrayal trauma; 
Higher = history of at least one higher betrayal trauma. Est. = estimated. Error bars 
represent standard errors.  
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Research Question 2: Is There an Association Between Personal Trauma History 
and Number of Recipients That Impacts Willingness to Donate and Amount 
Donated? 
  For the single recipient, 91.6% of those with no trauma history, 96.1% of those in 
the low betrayal group, and 94.1% of the high betrayal trauma group made donations.  To 
the group, 95.6% of the no trauma group, 90.2% of the low group, and 91% of the high 
group contributed.  There was not an interaction between personal trauma history and 
number of recipients on willingness to donate, χ2 (5, N = 513) = 3.72, p = .590, Cramer’s 
V = .085.   
 See Table 17 for means and standard deviations of amount donated for the 
number of recipients by type of traumatic event interaction.  After controlling for the 
effects of the covariates, the estimated means are shown in Table 18.  There was not a 
significant interaction between number of recipients and trauma history on total amount 
donated, F(2, 377) = 0.49, p = .998, ηp2 < .001.   
 
Table 17.  Means and Standard Deviations of Amount Donated by Number of Recipients 
and Trauma History in Study 2. 
 Trauma History   
Number of Recipients None Lower Higher   
Single  66.29 (33.22) 63.98 (31.04) 63.72 (33.89)   
Group 69.38 (30.76) 63.29 (35.53) 64.76 (32.67)   
Note.  Standard deviations in parentheses.  N = 513.   
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Table 18.  Estimated Means and Standard Errors of Amount Donated by Number of 
Recipients and Trauma History in Study 2. 
 Trauma History   
Number of Recipients None Lower Higher   
Single  61.44 (4.21) 64.90 (5.53) 59.17 (4.36)   
Group 63.34 (3.66) 66.36 (6.25) 61.32 (3.78)   
Note.  Standard errors in parentheses.  N = 445.   
 
 
Hypothesis 3: Persons of a Prosocial Value Orientation Will Donate More Money. 
 Most of the sample (51.7%, n = 265) was classified as having a prosocial value 
orientation.  The next highest categorization was individualistic with 25.0% of the sample 
(n = 128) while the least frequent orientation was competitive (10.1%, n = 52).  
Approximately 13% (n = 68) of the sample did not endorse a consistent strategy, thus 
were considered unclassifiable, and were excluded from analyses.  Of those with a 
prosocial orientation, 94.7% made a donation.  For the individualistic and competitive 
orientations, 91.4% and 86.5% donated, respectively.  Rate of donation did not vary 
across social value orientation, χ2 (2, N = 445) = 4.89, p = .087, Cramer’s V = .105.   
 In descending order, the average amounts donated by the groups were:  69.1 (SD 
= 31.1, SE = 1.91) by the prosocial group, 58.4 (SD = 33.7, SE = 2.98) by the 
individualistic group, and 57.1 (SD = 35.0, SE = 4.86) by the competitive group.  After 
controlling for the effects of the covariates, the mean estimated amounts donated by the 
groups are as follows: prosocial (M = 65.7, SE = 1.87), individualistic (M = 63.9, SE = 
2.93), and competitive (M = 58.7, SE = 4.77); see Figure 27.  Amount donated did not 
vary based on social value orientation, F(2, 377) = 0.22, p = .800, ηp2 = .001.  There was 
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also not a significant interaction between social value orientation and number of 
recipients, F(2, 377) = 0.76, p = .466, ηp2 = .004, nor for the interaction between social 
value orientation and trauma history, F(4, 377) = 1.34, p = .257, ηp2 = .014.  The three-
way interaction between social value orientation, trauma history, and number was also 
non-significant, F(4, 377) = 0.71, p = .585, ηp2 = .007.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 27.  Estimated mean amount donated by social value orientation. Est. = estimated. 
Error bars represent standard errors in Study 2.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Persons With Increased Agreeableness and Extraversion Will Be 
More Willing to Donate and Will Donate More Money. 
 Point-biserial correlations showed that people who scored higher on 
agreeableness were more likely to donate, r(511) = .115, = .009, r2 = .013.  There were 
no other personality differences associated with willingness to donate: extraversion, 
r(511) = .063, p = .155, r2 = .004, conscientiousness r(511) = .021, p = .637, r2 < .001, 
emotional stability r(511) = .053, p = .231, r2 = .003, openness r(511) = .027, p = .537, r2 
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= .001.   However, when controlling for the effects of the emotional response variables, 
agreeableness was no longer related to willingness to donate, r(505) = -.022, p = .624, r2 
< .001.   
 The means, standard deviations, and correlations for the personality 
characteristics are provided in Table 19.  Agreeableness was significantly correlated with 
amount donated, r(511) = .111, p = .012, r2 = .012.  See Figure 28 for a plot of the 
regression lines for the amounts donated by personality characteristics. 
 
Table 19.  Correlations among Personality Characteristics and Total Amount Donated in 
Study 2. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
1.  Amount donated -      
2.  Extraversion .048 (.87)     
3.  Agreeableness .111* .143** (.78)    
4.  Conscientiousness .051 .097* .326** (.79)   
5.  Emotional stability .006 -.233** -.293** -.125** (.83)  
6.  Openness .004 .188** .078 .051 -.009 (.81) 
Mean 65.6 3.28 3.82 3.61 2.99 3.78 
Standard deviation 32.7 0.82 0.61 0.64 0.75 0.58 
       
Note.  * p < .05, ** p < .01; Cronbach’s αs reported on the diagonal.   
 
 However, none of the personality variables significantly predicted total amount 
donated after accounting for other factors: extraversion (p = .850), agreeableness (p = 
.735), conscientiousness (p = .788), emotional stability (p = .788), and openness (p = 
.676).   See Table 20 for the results of the F-tests.   
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Table 20.  Results of Personality Variables Predicting Amount Donated in Study 2.   
Source SS df MS F p ηp2 
Extraversion 26.8 1 26.8 0.04 .850 <.001 
Agreeableness 86.0 1 86.0 0.11 .735 <.001 
Conscientiousness 27.0 1 27.0 0.04 .850 <.001 
Emotional 
Stability 
54.2 1 54.2 0.07 .788 <.001 
Openness 131.3 1 131.3     0.18 .676 <.001  
Error 283565.6 377 752.2    
Corrected Total 475435.3 444     
 
 
 
Figure 28.  Regression fit lines for amount donated by personality characteristics scores 
in Study 2. 
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Hypothesis 5: People With Higher Social Desirability Will Be More Willing to 
Donate and Report Higher Donation Amounts. 
 The mean social desirability value was 4.02 (SD = 0.54, SE = 0.02).  There was 
not a significant association between social desirability and willingness to donate, r(511) 
= .067, p = .130, r2 = .004.  Yet, the correlation between social desirability and total 
amount donated was significant, r(511) = .088, p = .047, r2 = .008; see Figure 29.  
However, when included in the model, amount donated did not vary based on social 
desirability, F(1, 377) = 0.15, p = .697, ηp2 = <.001.   
 
 
Figure 29.  Regression fit line for amount donated by social desirability in Study 2. 
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Hypothesis 6: People Who Use Suppression as an Emotion Regulation Will Report 
Lower Donation Amounts, While Those Who Use Reappraisal Will Report Higher 
Amounts. 
 The mean reappraisal score was 4.95 (SD =1.01, SE = 0.45) and the mean 
suppression score was 3.64 (SD =1.21, SE = 0.53).  Neither emotion regulation strategy 
was associated with willingness to make a donation: reappraisal r(511) = .038, p = .386, 
r2 = .001, and suppression, r(511) = -.036, p = .420, r2 = .001.  However, there was a 
significant correlation between reappraisal and total amount donated, r(511) = .089, p = 
.044, r2 = .008.  The correlation between suppression and amount donated was not 
significant, r(511) = -.024, p = .595, r2 < .0001; see Figure 30.  Yet, when accounting for 
the other variables of interest, amount donated was not associated with either reappraisal, 
F(1, 377) = 0.20, p = .658, ηp2 = .001, or suppression, F(1, 377) = 0.27, p = .606, ηp2 = 
.001. 
 
 
Figure 30.  Regression fit line for amount donated by emotion regulation strategy in 
Study 2. 
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Hypothesis 7: More Empathetic People Will Be More Willing to Donate and Report 
Higher Donation Amounts. 
 The mean trait empathy score was 3.42 (SD = 0.43, SE = 0.02).  Higher trait 
empathy was associated with both a greater willingness to donate, r(511) = .158, p < 
.001, r2 = .025, and total amount donated, r(511) = .167, p < .001, r2 = .028.  See Figure 
31.  However, when accounting for the effects of the other variables, empathy was not 
associated with either greater willingness to donate, r(505) = -.071, p = .108, r2 = .005, or 
total donation amount, F(1, 377) = 0.97, p = .326, ηp2 = .003. 
 
 
Figure 31.  Regression fit line for amount donated by trait empathy in Study 2. 
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.147, p = .001, r2 = .022, and total amount donated, r(511) = .209, p < .001, r2 = .044.  
See Figure 32.  Yet, prosocialness was not associated with greater willingness to donate, 
r(505) = -.082, p = .065, r2 = .007, or total donation amount, F(1, 377) = 1.03, p = .311, 
ηp2 = .003, once the effects of the other variables were controlled.   
 
 
Figure 32.  Regression fit line for amount donated by prosocialness in Study 2. 
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 The mean betrayal awareness score was 3.84 (SD = 0.82, SE = 0.04).  Betrayal 
awareness was not associated with willingness to donate, r(511) = -.006, p = .890, r2 < 
.001.  There was a non-significant correlation between betrayal awareness and total 
amount donated, r(511) = -.002, p = .971, r2 < .001; see Figure 33.  Unsurprisingly, when 
included in the model, betrayal awareness was not associated with total donation amount, 
F(1, 377) = 0.01, p = .971, ηp2 < .001. 
 
 
Figure 33.  Regression fit line for amount donated by betrayal awareness in Study 2. 
 
Research Question 3: Is There an Interaction Between the Different Emotional 
Responses and Number of Recipients?   
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Table 21.  Percentile Values for Emotional Response Variables in Study 2. 
 Percentiles 
5 10 25 50 75 90 95 
Emotions 
Sad 3.00 3.70 4.50 5.50 6.50 7.00 7.00 
Sympathy 3.50 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 
Anger 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 7.00 
Betrayal 2.00 2.50 3.50 4.50 5.50 6.50 7.00 
Guilty 1.00 2.00 4.00 5.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 
 Impact 2.00 2.00 4.00 5.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 
  
 All of the emotions significantly interacted with number of recipients on 
willingness to donate: sad (p < .001, two-tailed Fisher’s exact test, Cramer’s V = .309); 
sympathy (p < .001, two-tailed Fisher’s exact test, Cramer’s V = .306); anger (p < .001, 
two-tailed Fisher’s exact test, Cramer’s V = .283); guilt (p < .001, two-tailed Fisher’s 
exact test, Cramer’s V = .463); betrayal (p = .032, two-tailed Fisher’s exact test, Cramer’s 
V = .181); and impact (p < .001, two-tailed Fisher’s exact test, Cramer’s V = .425).  As in 
Study 1, at the lower emotion ratings, participants were less willing to donate to the 
group of recipients than expected. 
 There were no significant interactions for total amount donated between number 
of recipients and feelings of: sadness, F(1, 377) = 0.12, p = .733, ηp2 < .001; sympathy, 
F(1, 377) = 0.21, p = .650, ηp2 = .001; betrayal, F(1, 377) = 1.39, p = .240, ηp2 = .004; and 
guilt, F(1, 377) = 2.22, p = .137, ηp2 = .006.  Unlike in Study 1, the interaction between 
number and anger was not significant, F(1, 377) = 2.04, p = .154, ηp2 = .005.   
Also, the slopes were parallel for the interaction between belief in the donation making a 
difference and number of recipients on amount donated, F(1, 377) = 2.72, p = .100, ηp2 = 
.007.   
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Research Question 4: Is There an Interaction Between the Different Emotional 
Responses and Trauma History? 
 Perceived impact interacted with trauma history on willingness to donate (p < 
.001, two-tailed Fisher’s exact test, Cramer’s V = .408).  Unlike Study 1, there was a 
significant interaction between personal trauma history and levels of anger (p < .001, 
two-tailed Fisher’s exact test, Cramer’s V = .299), but the interaction between trauma 
history and betrayal (p = .187, two-tailed Fisher’s exact test, Cramer’s V = .178) was not 
significant.  As found in Study 1, the other emotions also significantly interacted with 
trauma history on willingness to donate: sympathy (p < .001, two-tailed Fisher’s exact 
test, Cramer’s V = .286); sadness (p = < .001, two-tailed Fisher’s exact test, Cramer’s V = 
.295); and guilt (p < .001, two-tailed Fisher’s exact test, Cramer’s V = .466).  Participants 
with no trauma background and those with higher betrayal histories were less willing to 
donate than expected at the lower levels of the emotions.   
 The interactions for total amount donated between trauma history and emotional 
responses were not significant: sadness, F(2, 377) = 1.84, p = .160, ηp2 = .010; sympathy, 
F(2, 377) = 1.59, p = .204, ηp2 = .008; anger, F(2, 377) = 0.17, p = .840, ηp2 = .001; 
betrayal, F(2, 377) = 0.12, p = .890, ηp2 = .001; guilt, F(2, 377) = 2.09, p = .126, ηp2 = 
.011; and impact, F(2, 377) = 0.29, p = .748, ηp2 = .002. 
 
Research Question 5: Are There Interactions Between the Different Emotional 
Responses and Social Value Orientation? 
 Willingness to donate varied across the emotion levels differentially for the types 
of social value orientation.  Those with either an individualistic orientation or a prosocial 
orientation were less willing to donate than expected at lower levels of: sadness (p < .001, 
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two-tailed Fisher’s exact test, Cramer’s V = .337); sympathy (p < .001, two-tailed 
Fisher’s exact test, Cramer’s V = .308); anger (p < .001, two-tailed Fisher’s exact test, 
Cramer’s V = .337); guilt (p < .001, two-tailed Fisher’s exact test, Cramer’s V = .498); 
betrayal (p = .004, two-tailed Fisher’s exact test, Cramer’s V = .227); and impact (p < 
.001, two-tailed Fisher’s exact test, Cramer’s V = .440).  See Figure 34 for an example 
using guilt.   
 
Figure 34.  Willingness to donate by social value orientation across quartiles of guilt in 
Study 2.  First = first quartile, second = second quartile, third = third quartile, fourth = 
fourth quartile.   
 
 The interactions for amount donated between social value orientation and 
emotional responses were not significant: sadness, F(2, 377) = 0.55 p = .578, ηp2 = .003; 
sympathy, F(2, 377) = 0.04, p = .962, ηp2 < .001; anger, F(2, 377) = 1.29, p = .277, ηp2 = 
.007; betrayal, F(2, 377) = 0.51, p = .600, ηp2 = .003; guilt, F(2, 377) = 2.73, p = .066, ηp2 
= .014; and impact, F(2, 377) = 2.24, p = .108, ηp2 = .012. 
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Hypothesis 10: People Will Be More Willing to Donate, and Donate More, to the 
Flood Condition Than to the Genocide Condition. 
 Looking at willingness to donate, 91.4% of the sample (n = 468) made donations 
to both conditions.  Only 1.8% of the sample (n = 9) made a donation to the genocide 
condition, but did not contribute to the flood condition; 1 participant did the reverse.  
McNemar's chi-square test with continuity correction showed this was a significant 
difference, χ2 (1, N = 513) = 4.90, p = .027, odds ratio = 0.11.  Thus, people were more 
willing to make a donation to the genocide conditions than the flood conditions.   
 The mean amount donated to the genocide scenario was 34.4 (SD =19.0, SE = 
0.84) and to the natural disaster condition was 31.3 (SD =17.0, SE = 0.75).  After 
controlling for the effects of the covariates, there was not a significant difference in the 
average amount donated to the genocide group (M = 33.8, SE = 0.89) compared to the 
natural disaster group (M = 31.2, SE = 0.80), F(1, 477) = 0.93, p = .337, ηp2 = .002; see 
Figure 35.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 35.  Estimated mean amount donated for each type of traumatic event in Study 2. 
Est. = estimated. Error bars represent standard errors.  
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Hypothesis 11: People Will Be More Willing to Donate, and Donate More, to the 
Lower Betrayal Condition Than to the Higher Betrayal Condition.   
 Looking at betrayal level of event on willingness to donate, 0.8% of the sample (n 
= 4) made a donation to the high betrayal condition, but did not donate to the low betrayal 
condition; 1.2% (n = 6) of the sample showed the opposite pattern.  McNemar's chi-
square test with continuity correction showed there was no difference in willingness to 
donate based on betrayal level, χ2 (1, N = 513) = 0.10, p = .752, odds ratio = 0.67.   
 To the high betrayal conditions, participants donated on average 32.9 (SD =17.8, 
SE = 0.79); the average amount donated to the low betrayal conditions was 32.8 (SD 
=18.4, SE = 0.81).  After controlling for the effects of the covariates, there was not a 
difference in donation amounts for the high betrayal conditions (M = 32.5, SE = 0.84) 
compared to the low betrayal conditions (M = 32.5, SE = 0.86), F(1, 477) = 3.33, p = 
.068, ηp2 = .007; see Figure 36.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 36.  Estimated mean amount donated for each level of betrayal of the traumatic 
event in Study 2. Est. = estimated. Error bars represent standard errors.  
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Manipulation Check 
 
 Participants rated the genocide vignette (M = 5.02, SD = 1.70, SE = 0.08) 
significantly higher in betrayal than the natural disaster condition (M = 3.82, SD = 2.17, 
SE = 0.10), F(1, 512) = 114.9, p < .001, ηp2 = .183.  Within scenarios, participants were 
able to differentiate the levels of betrayal.  The high betrayal genocide condition (M = 
5.32, SD = 1.53, SE = 0.09) was considered more of a betrayal than the low betrayal 
genocide condition (M = 4.71, SD = 1.81, SE = 0.11), t(489.02) = 4.07, p < .001, d = 
0.37.  The low flood condition (M = 2.64, SD = 1.83, SE = 0.11) was seen as less of a 
betrayal than the high flood scenario (M = 5.06, SD = 1.76, SE = 0.11), t(511) = 15.3, p < 
.001, d = 1.35. 
 
Research Question 6: Is There an Association Between Personal Trauma History 
and Type of Event That Impacts Willingness to Donate and Amount Donated? 
 Of those with no trauma history, 93.8% made a donation to the genocide 
conditions; similarly, 93.1% of the lower — and 92.1% of the higher — betrayal trauma 
groups donated.  There was not an association between personal trauma history and 
willingness to donate for the genocide conditions, χ2 (2, N = 513) = 0.46, p = .795, 
Cramer’s V = .030.  For the flood conditions, 90.9% of the no trauma history group 
contributed; for the two trauma groups, 92.2% and 91.6% of the lower and higher 
betrayal trauma groups donated, respectively.  Willingness to donate for the flood 
conditions did not vary across trauma history, χ2 (2, N = 513) = 0.15, p = .929, Cramer’s 
V = .017. 
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  See Table 22 for means and standard deviations of amount donated for the 
interaction between type of event and trauma history.  After controlling for the effects of 
the covariates, the estimated means are shown in Table 23 and Figure 37.  Personal 
trauma history was not associated with differences in donations to the genocide and 
natural disaster conditions, F(2,477) = 0.22, p = .807, ηp2 = .001.   
 
 
Table 22.  Means and Standard Deviations of Amount Donated by Type of Traumatic 
Event and Trauma History in Study 2. 
 Trauma History   
Type of Event None Lower Higher   
Genocide  35.58 (19.6) 32.52 (17.8) 34.0 (18.9)   
Natural Disaster 32.39 (17.2) 31.12 (17.2) 30.20 (16.8)   
Note.  Standard deviations in parentheses.  N = 513.   
 
 
 
Table 23.  Estimated Means and Standard Errors of Amount Donated by Type of 
Traumatic Event and Trauma History in Study 2. 
 Trauma History   
Type of Event None Lower Higher   
Genocide  35.57 (1.31) 31.69 (1.90) 34.06 (1.33)   
Natural Disaster 32.31 (1.19) 31.27 (1.72) 30.07 (1.20)   
Note.  Standard errors in parentheses.  N = 513.   
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Figure 37.  Estimated mean amount donated for type of event by trauma history in Study 
2. None = no betrayal trauma history; Lower = history of at least one lower betrayal 
trauma; Higher = history of at least one higher betrayal trauma. Est. = estimated.  
 
 
Research Question 7: Is There an Association Between Personal Trauma History 
and Level of Betrayal of Event That Relates to Amount Donated? 
 Of those with no trauma history, 91.9% and 92.8% made donations to the high 
and low betrayal conditions, respectively.  For those with a lower betrayal trauma history, 
92.2% and 93.1% made donations to the high and low betrayal conditions, respectively.  
Lastly, for those who had experienced a high betrayal trauma, 91.6% donated to the low 
betrayal and 92.1% donated to the high betrayal event.  Willingness to donate did not 
vary across trauma groups for either the high betrayal versions, χ2 (2, N = 513) = 0.10, p 
= .995, Cramer’s V = .004, or for the low betrayal versions, χ2 (2, N = 513) = 0.32, p = 
.851, Cramer’s V = .025.   
 See Table 24 for means and standard deviations of amount donated for the 
interaction between type of event and trauma history.  After controlling for the effects of 
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the covariates, the estimated means are shown in Table 25 and Figure 38.  There were no 
differences in donations to the high and low betrayal conditions across trauma groups, 
F(2, 477) = 0.75, p = .471, ηp2 = .003.   
 
Table 24.  Means and Standard Deviations of Amount Donated by Betrayal Level of 
Event and Trauma History in Study 2. 
 Trauma History   
Betrayal Level None Lower Higher   
High  35.58 (19.6) 32.52 (17.8) 34.0 (18.9)   
Low 32.39 (17.2) 31.12 (17.2) 30.20 (16.8)   
Note.  Standard deviations in parentheses.  N = 513.   
 
 
 
Table 25.  Estimated Means and Standard Errors of Amount Donated by Betrayal Level 
of Event and Trauma History in Study 2. 
 Trauma History   
Betrayal Level None Lower Higher   
High 33.85 (1.24) 31.01 (1.80) 32.62 (1.26)   
Low 34.04 (1.27) 31.95 (1.85) 31.52 (1.29)   
Note.  Standard errors in parentheses.  N = 513.   
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Figure 38.  Estimated mean amount donated for betrayal level of event by trauma history 
in Study 2. None = no betrayal trauma history; Lower = history of at least one lower 
betrayal trauma; Higher = history of at least one higher betrayal trauma. Est. = estimated.  
 
 
Research Question 8: Do Differences in Emotional Responses Predict Differences in 
Donations to the Genocide and Flood Conditions? 
 Of those who donated to only one scenario, 40% had the same values for sadness 
for both conditions, 50% had the same values for sympathy, 50% for anger, 30% for 
guilty, 20% for betrayal, and 50% for impact of donation.   
 Given the small sample sizes of those who were discordant in their donation 
decisions for the type of event (n =10), analyses looking at emotional differences to 
account for these differences were not undertaken out of concern of inadequate power. 
 Table 26 shows the means and standard deviations for the differences in amounts 
donated for the two scenarios and the differences in emotional response variables; it also 
includes the correlations among these variables.  All emotional response variables were 
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significantly positively correlated with differences in amount donated, ps < .05; see 
Figure 39.   
 
Table 26.  Correlations among Differences in Emotional Response Variables and 
Differences in Amount Donated for Genocide and Natural Disaster Conditions in Study 
2.   
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1.  Δ Amount -       
2.  Δ Sad .144** -      
3.  Δ Sympathy .144** .583** -     
4.  Δ Anger .092* .275** .211** -    
5.  Δ Betrayal .121** .105* .110* .572** -   
6.  Δ Guilt .309** .267** .217** .152** .136** -  
7.  Δ Impact .211** .053 .006 -.091* -.104* .239** - 
Mean Δ 3.09 0.08 0.05 0.70 0.04 1.20 -0.08 
Standard deviation 15.3 0.97 0.82 1.57 0.74 2.53 0.84 
        
Note.  * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
 After controlling for the effects of the covariates, only differences in guilt and 
belief in the donation making a difference significantly predicted amount donated; people 
donated more money to the scenario they had higher feelings of guilt about and higher 
belief the donation would make a difference, ps < .001.   See Table 27 for the results of 
the F-tests.   
 
Research Question 9: Do Differences in Emotional Responses Predict Differences in 
Donations to the High and Low Betrayal Levels?    
 As with donations, because of the small sample size (n =10), analyses looking at 
changes in emotional responses to account for the differences in willingness to donate 
were not undertaken because of inadequate power. 
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Table 27.  Results of Differences in Emotional Responses Predicting Differences in 
Amount Donated for Genocide and Natural Disaster Conditions in Study 2.   
Source SS df MS F p ηp2 
Δ Sad 27.3 1 27.3 0.27 .604 .001 
Δ Sympathy 77.8 1 77.8 0.77 .381 .002 
Δ Anger 0.7 1 0.7 <0.01 .932 <.001 
Δ Betrayal 345.4 1 345.4 3.42 .065 .007 
Δ Guilty 2045.3 1 2045.3 20.23 <.001 .041 
Δ Impact 1737.6 1 1737.6 17.18 <.001 .035 
Error 48232.9 477 101.1    
      
 
 
Figure 39.  Regression fit line for differences in amount donated for type of event by 
differences in emotional responses in Study 2. Positive numbers indicate larger values for 
the genocide scenarios; negative numbers indicate larger values for the flood scenarios.   
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 Correlations, with means and standard deviations, for differences in amounts 
donated for the two betrayal levels and emotional responses are shown in Table 28.  All 
emotional response variables were significantly positively correlated with differences in 
amount donated, ps < .01; see Figure 40.  However, when included in the model, only 
differences in guilt significantly predicted differences in amount donated, p < .001.   See 
Table 29 for the results of the F-tests. 
 
Table 28.  Correlations among Differences in Emotional Response Variables and 
Differences in Amount Donated for Genocide and Natural Disaster Conditions in Study 
2.   
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1.  Δ Amount -       
2.  Δ Sad .157** -      
3.  Δ Sympathy .154** .587** -     
4.  Δ Anger .172** .288** .243** -    
5.  Δ Betrayal .229** .130* .172** .585** -   
6.  Δ Guilt .315** .270** .221** .161** .155** -  
7.  Δ Make Difference .190** .050 -.004 -.087* -.085 .237** - 
Mean Δ 0.02 0.04 -0.03 0.58 1.54 0.03 -0.10 
Standard deviation 15.6 0.98 0.82 1.62 2.34 0.75 0.84 
        
Note.  * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
Research Question 10: Does the Number of Recipients Produce Differences in a) 
Donations to the Two Types of Scenarios or b) Donations to the Two Betrayal 
Levels? 
  Willingness to donate did not vary across number of recipients for type of event, 
(p = .570, two-tailed Fisher’s exact test, Cramer’s V = .066) or for betrayal levels, (p = 
.305, two-tailed Fisher’s exact test, Cramer’s V = .087).  
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Figure 40.  Regression fit line for differences in amount donated for betrayal levels by 
differences in emotional responses in Study 2. Positive numbers indicate larger values for 
the high betrayal versions; negative numbers indicate larger values for the low betrayal 
versions.   
 
 
Table 29.  Results of Differences in Emotional Responses Predicting Differences in 
Amount Donated for High and Low Betrayal Levels in Study 2.   
Source SS df MS F p ηp2 
Δ Sad 51.5 1 51.5 0.48 .491 .001 
Δ Sympathy 166.6 1 166.6 1.54 .215 .003 
Δ Anger 29.6 1 29.6 0.27 .601 .001 
Δ Betrayal 25.6 1 25.6 0.24 .627 <.001 
Δ Guilty 1236.9 1 1236.9 11.43 .001 .023 
Δ Make 
Difference 
292.4 1 292.4 2.70 .101 .006 
Error 51629.0 477     
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 There was also not significant interactions between trauma history and number of 
recipients on willingness to donate for type of event, (p = .644, two-tailed Fisher’s exact 
test, Cramer’s V = .088), or for betrayal levels, (p = .737, two-tailed Fisher’s exact test, 
Cramer’s V = .089).   
 There was not a significant main effect for number of recipients on differences in 
donations for the type of event, F(1, 477) = 0.58, p = .447, ηp2 = .001, nor for differences 
in donations to the betrayal levels, F(2, 477) = 1.43, p = .232, ηp2 = .003.  There were also 
not significant interactions between number of recipients and trauma history when 
comparing the type of event, F(2, 477) = 0.63, p = .531, ηp2 = .003, or the betrayal level, 
F(2, 477) = 0.65, p = .525, ηp2 = .003. 
 
Research Question 11: Does the Effect of Differences in Emotional Responses Vary 
Across Trauma Backgrounds Producing Differences in a) Donations to the Two 
Types of Scenarios or b) Donations to the Two Betrayal Levels? 
 There were no significant interactions between trauma history and emotional 
response on differences in donations amounts for the two types of events with: sadness, 
F(2, 477) = 0.05, p = .955, ηp2 < .001; sympathy,  F(2, 477) = 0.78,  p = .457, ηp2 = .003; 
anger, F(2, 477) = 0.54, p = .581, ηp2 =.002; betrayal, F(2, 477) = 1.51, p = .222, ηp2 = 
.006; and belief the donation will make a difference, F(2, 477) = 0.90, p = .409, ηp2 = 
.004.  There was a significant interaction between trauma history and feelings of guilt, 
F(2, 477) = 4.62, p = .010, ηp2 = .019; see Figure 41.  For people with no betrayal trauma 
history, as the differences in feelings of guilt increased, the differences in donation 
amounts to the two types of events widened compared to the other trauma groups.  This 
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suggests that those with no trauma history were more affected by differences in feelings 
of guilt that in turn influenced how much they donated.   
 The same pattern is found for donations to the high and low betrayal levels as 
well.  There were no significant interactions for: sadness, F(2, 477) = 0.33, p = .718, ηp2 
= .001; sympathy,  F(2, 477) = 0.36, p = .698, ηp2 = .002; anger, F(2, 477) = 0.97, p = 
.379, ηp2 =.004; betrayal, F(2, 477) = 0.42, p = .660, ηp2 = .002; and belief the donation 
will make a difference, F(2, 477) = 2.97, p = .052, ηp2 = .012.  Yet, there was a 
significant interaction between trauma history and feelings of guilt, F(2, 477) = 7.42, p = 
.001, ηp2 = .030; see Figure 42.  Again, the group with no trauma history was more 
influenced by differences in feelings of guilt when making donations than the other 
trauma groups.   
 
 
Figure 41.  Regression fit line for differences in amount donated to the type of events by 
differences in feelings of guilt for the three trauma groups in Study 2. Positive numbers 
indicate larger values for the genocide conditions; negative numbers indicate larger 
values for the natural disaster conditions. 
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Figure 42.  Regression fit line for differences in amount donated to betrayal level of 
events by differences in feelings of guilt for the three trauma groups in Study 2. Positive 
numbers indicate larger values for the high betrayal levels; negative numbers indicate 
larger values for the low betrayal levels. 
 
Hypothesis 12: Lower Betrayal Awareness Will Be Associated With Higher 
Donations to a) the Natural Disaster Condition and b) the Lower Betrayal 
Conditions. 
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betrayal levels, r(511) = .110, p = .012, r2 = .012; see Figure 43.  As betrayal awareness 
increased, donations increased for the higher betrayal conditions. 
 When included in the model, unsurprisingly, betrayal awareness did not predict 
differences in donations for the two types of events, F(1, 477) = 0.21, p = .650, ηp2 < 
.001.  Additionally, there was not an interaction of trauma history and betrayal awareness 
on differences in donations for the flood or genocide conditions, F(2, 477) = 0.18, p = 
.839, ηp2 = .001.  The main effect of betrayal awareness on differences in donation 
amounts for the betrayal levels of the events was no longer significant when in the model, 
F(1, 477) = 3.70, p = .055, ηp2 = .008.  The interaction between betrayal awareness and 
trauma group was not significant either, F(2, 477) = 1.37, p = .256, ηp2 = .006.   
 
Figure 43.  Regression fit line for differences in amount donated to betrayal level of 
events by differences by betrayal awareness in Study 2. Positive numbers indicate larger 
values for the high betrayal levels; negative numbers indicate larger values for the low 
betrayal levels. 
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Follow-Up Analyses 
 As in Study 1, there was not a significant effect of number of recipients on 
average emotional ratings, Wilk’s Λ = .988, F(6, 506) = 0.49, p = .487, multivariate η2 = 
.011.  The results of the univariate ANOVAs are: sadness, F(1, 511) = 2.26, p = .134, η2 
= .004; sympathy, F(1, 511) = 1.30, p = .254, η2 = .003; anger, F(1, 511) = 3.12, p = .079, 
η2 =.006; guilt, F(1, 511) = 0.02, p = .891, η2 < .001; impact, F(1, 511) = 0.70, p = .402, 
η2 = .001; and betrayal, F(1, 511) = 3.38, p = .067, η2 =.007.   
 There was also not a significant effect of trauma history on emotional ratings, 
Roy’s Largest Root = 0.02, F(6, 506) = 1.33, p = .240, multivariate η2 = .016.  The results 
of the univariate ANOVAs are: sadness, F(2, 510) = 0.51, p = .601, η2 = .002; sympathy, 
F(2, 510) = 1.01, p = .366, η2 = .004; anger, F(2, 510) = 1.63, p = .196, η2 =.006; guilt, 
F(2, 510) = 0.13, p = .880, η2 = .001; impact, F(2, 510) = 0.01, p = .992, η2 < .001; and 
betrayal, F(2, 510) = 1.53, p = .217, η2 =.006.   
 
Between-Subjects Approach 
 Given the significant order effects, a secondary analysis was conducted taking a 
between-subjects approach using the first condition presented to better understand any 
differences between the types, and betrayal levels, of the events.  Overall, 92% of the 
sample (n = 474) donated an average 33.5 (SD =18.9).   
 
Hypothesis 1: Donations Will Be Lower for a) the Genocide Events and b) the High 
Betrayal Version of Scenarios. 
 Overall, 92% of the sample (n = 474) made a hypothetical donation, leaving a 
small sample size (n = 39) of those who did not donate.  Approximately the same 
 108 
percentages of participants made donations to the genocide (91.3%) and flood (93.4%) 
scenarios, χ2 (1, N = 513) = 0.80, p = .370, ϕ = .040.   There was not a difference in 
willingness to donate for the high (92.2%) and low (92.6%) betrayal levels, χ2 (1, N = 
513) = 0.04, p = .838, ϕ = .009. 
 See Table 30 for means and standard deviations of amount donated for both type 
of event and betrayal level.  Table 31 provides the estimated marginal means and 
standard errors after controlling for the effects of the covariates.  There was not a main 
effect for type of event, F(1, 502) = 3.06, p = .081, ηp2 = .006.  However, the main effect 
for betrayal level was significant, F(1, 502) = 14.5, p < .001, ηp2 = .028; people donated 
significantly more money to the lower betrayal versions of events; see Figure 44.  The 
interaction between type of event and betrayal level was not significant, F(1, 502) = 0.48, 
p = .488, ηp2 = .001.   
 
Table 30.  Means and Standard Deviations of Amount Donated by Type and Betrayal 
Level of Events in Study 2.   
 Type of Event     
Betrayal Level Genocide Natural Disaster Mean Betrayal     
High 33.98 (19.0) 29.29 (16.9) 31.67 (18.1)     
Low 37.58 (21.7) 33.02 (16.8) 35.23 (19.4)     
Mean Type 35.75 (20.4) 31.21(16.9)     
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Table 31.  Estimated Means and Standard Errors of Amount Donated by Type and 
Betrayal Level of Events in Study 2.   
 Type of Event     
Betrayal Level Genocide Natural Disaster Mean Betrayal     
High 32.25 (1.48) 28.55 (1.48) 30.40 (1.08)     
Low 37.29 (1.46) 35.67 (1.62) 36.48 (1.07)     
Mean Event 34.77 (1.05) 32.11(1.04)     
 
   
Figure 44. Estimated mean amount donated for the betrayal levels of the traumatic events 
for the between-subjects analysis in Study 2. Est. = estimated.  
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r(511) = .476, p < .001, r2 = .227; and impact, r(511) = .437, p < .001, r2 = .191.  Partial 
correlations for feelings of guilt, r(506) = .264, p < .001, r2 = .070, and impact, r(506) = 
.205, p < .001, r2 = .042, remain significant after controlling for the effects of the other 
emotions.   
 Table 32 shows the means and standard deviations for the amount donated in the 
first condition and the emotional response variables; it also includes the correlations 
among these variables.  See Figure 45 for a plot of the mean amounts donated by 
emotional response values.  All emotional response variables were significantly 
positively correlated with amount donated to the first condition, ps < .01.   
 
Table 32.  Correlations among Emotional Response Variables and Amount Donated in 
First Condition Presented in Study 2. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1.  Amount -       
2.  Sad .338** -      
3.  Sympathy .318** .801** -     
4.  Anger .243** .503** .457** -    
5.  Betrayal .221** .283** .252** .583** -   
6.  Guilt .413** .478** .491** .317** .232** -  
7.  Impact .439** .462** .482** .212** .184** .600** - 
Mean 33.5 5.33 5.70 4.84 4.38 4.91 4.96 
Standard deviation 18.9 1.41 1.22 1.66 1.96 1.97 1.80 
        
Note.  ** p < .01 
 
 As before, guilt and belief in the donation making a difference significantly 
predicted amount donated, such that increased feelings of guilt (p < .001) and a higher 
impact of donation belief (p < .001) were associated with higher donation amounts.   
Betrayal rating also significantly was associated with amount donated, (p = .011).  See 
Table 33 for the results of the F-tests.   
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Table 33.  Results of Emotional Responses Predicting Amount Donated to the First 
Condition Presented in Study 2.   
Source SS df MS F p ηp2 
Sad 640.1 1 640.1 2.44 .119 .005 
Sympathy 124.2 1 124.2 0.47 .492 .001 
Anger 180.4 1 180.4 0.69 .407 .001 
Betrayal 1717.7 1 1717.7 6.55 .011 .013 
Guilty 3674.0 1 3674.0     14.0 <.001 .027  
Impact 7198.6 1 7198.6 27.4 <.001 .052 
Error 283565.6 502 262.4    
Corrected Total 475435.3 512     
 
 
  
Figure 45.  Average amount donated to the first condition presented by emotional 
response ratings in Study 2.   
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Hypothesis 3: Participants with Lower Betrayal Awareness Will Donate More 
Money. 
 
 There was a non-significant correlation between betrayal awareness and both 
willingness to donate, r(511) = .022, p = .613, r2 < .001, and total amount donated, r(511) 
= .025, p = .565, r2 < .001.  Unsurprisingly, when included in the model, betrayal 
awareness was not associated with first condition donation amount, F(1, 502) = 0.25, p = 
.621, ηp2 < .001. 
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CHAPTER IX 
DISCUSSION – STUDY 2 
 The purpose of this study was to further explore helping behavior within a 
betrayal trauma framework.  Unlike Study 1, this experiment utilized a repeated-
measures design.  Interestingly, there were significant order effects observed.  People 
donated much more to the genocide conditions when presented with it first compared to 
when it followed the flood scenario.  There was also a significant order effect on donation 
differences between betrayal levels; people donated more to the low genocide condition 
when it was presented first.   
 Results from Marjanovic et al. (2012) may explain this.  Participants were asked 
to explain the factor they believe was “most responsible for causing the natural disaster in 
New Orleans” (p. 258) and their responses were then coded for human responsibility.  
They found that those who attributed more of the blame on human causes, that is, 
neglectful government or destructive social phenomena like prejudice, were more willing 
to help and hypothetically donated more.  It should be noted that none of the blame was 
laid at the feet of the citizens themselves.  The authors suggest this may happen because 
donors might believe that human agency can fix a problem human agency caused and so 
may be more willing to help.  Perhaps the order of the scenarios highlighted the human 
responsibility factor of the genocide conditions.  This would also explain the greater 
willingness to donate to the genocide scenarios observed.  However, because of the 
significant order effects, results should be interpreted with caution.   
 Taking a between-subjects approach using the first condition presented, no 
significant differences were found in terms of willingness to donate or amount donated 
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for the type of event.  Yet, there was a significant effect for betrayal level; people donated 
significantly more money to the lower betrayal versions of the events.  This is predicted 
by BTT and contradicts the results from Marjanovic et al. (2012).  In their study, 
perceived responsibility was not experimentally manipulated but rather was self-reported.  
Thus, people who are able to verbalize human culpability in natural disaster events are 
likely to be highly consciously aware of betrayal.  Yet, in this study, responsibility was 
clearly delineated.  Interestingly, participants clearly recognized the varying betrayal 
levels (as the higher betrayal events had higher betrayal ratings) and yet still donated 
more to the lower conditions.  Thus, the process of betrayal blindness may occur 
unconsciously when making charitable decisions.  Also, general betrayal awareness was 
not associated with charitable giving, either in total amount donated or differences in 
donations.  This suggests betrayal awareness may be a state construct that is activated 
under certain conditions rather than a general tendency.   
 Charitable behavior did not differ across personality traits.  While much research 
has demonstrated a connection (Caprara et al., 2010; Kosek, 1995), other research has 
shown no effect.  Personality variables, albeit not assessed using the Big Five framework, 
did not distinguish between donors and non-donors to the United Way (Yavas, Riecken, 
& Parameswaran, 1981).  Exline and Hill (2012) found that none of the five factors 
predicted amount donated to a charity.  Mlčák and Záškodna (2008) argue that the 
relationships between personality traits and prosocial behavior are better explained as a 
mediated process via cognitive and emotional empathy; thus, personality characteristics 
by themselves are not adequate explanatory factors of prosocial behavior.   
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 Reappraisal and suppression strategies of emotion regulation were not predictive 
of willingness to donate or donation amount.  Previous research has shown a link 
between emotion regulation and acting prosocially (Cameron & Payne, 2011; Rubaltelli 
& Agnoli, 2012; Shaw et al., 1994).  However, in these studies, participants were 
expressly told they would have the opportunity to help before responding to the 
scenarios.  Their findings suggest that it is a motivated proactive down-regulation of 
emotion that inhibits helping behavior.  In this study, participants were emotionally 
activated before they knew of potential donations they could provide.  Thus, general 
tendencies for emotion regulation may not be as important as the provocation of their use.   
 None of the trait measures of prosocial predisposition (i.e., social value 
orientation, empathy, prosociality) were positively associated with charitable behavior.  
Given the predictive strength of the state emotional responses, this may be evidence that 
transient emotional reactions may contribute more to prosocial behavior than general 
prosocial tendencies.  Snyder and Ickes (1985) propose that “strong” environments (e.g., 
experimental designs) can shift the cause of the behavior from a dispositional factor to a 
situational characteristic.  Thus, in this “strong” study with its stimuli manipulation and 
potential demand characteristics, the emotional state reactions may have overshadowed 
any personal proclivities.  This may also explain why participants with a prosocial 
orientation were less willing to donate at the lower levels of the emotional responses.  In 
a study by Batson, Bolen, Cross, and Neuringer-Benefiel (1986), higher ratings on 
altruistic personality measures were associated with a greater likelihood of providing aid, 
but only when escape was difficult.  When escape was easy, the correlations were no 
longer significant.  Escape was easy (i.e., they would not be reminded of their failure to 
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help) in this study, which may also account for the non-significant findings.  Marjanovic 
et al. (2012) provide another explanation; they demonstrated that, although the zero order 
correlations were strong between the trait and helping variables, the predictors offered 
minimal explanatory variance once control variables were also included in the model.  
The authors suggest that trait constructs may be most powerful when the recipients are 
perceived as responsible for the event, as helping seems to occur at consistent rates across 
the levels when victims are not blamable.   
 While using the first condition of this study due to the significant order effects is a 
valid approach, it does not reflect a true between-subjects design in this instance.  The 
donation questions were asked after both scenarios had been given to the participants.  
Thus, there may still be some carry-over effects in the between-subjects results.  Also, 
while the presentation of scenarios was counterbalanced, the photos associated with the 
scenarios were not; that is, the photos were nested in the event type condition.  However, 
a separate sample of similar demographics compared the photos and showed no 
preference for donation behavior based simply on picture.  Plus, there were no significant 
differences observed between the types of events.  Additionally, the high flood scenarios 
stated a bridge collapsing caused the flood; this is rather nonsensical and was due to 
experimenter error.  However, betrayal ratings were significantly higher for this 
condition, suggesting the error had no impact on interpretation.   
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CHAPTER X 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 The purpose of this dissertation was to utilize betrayal trauma theory to better 
understand helping behavior.  Two studies were conducted, both using college samples, 
to explore how betrayal trauma history and the betrayal level of events relate to 
hypothetical donations.  This is the first study to simultaneously look at the effects of 
trauma background and event type on charitable behavior.  See Table 34 for a summary 
of the findings for both studies.     
 Both studies attempted to replicate previous work showing that donations are 
higher for an individual recipient than for a group, the singularity effect.  However, 
neither of the experiments revealed a significant main effect for number of recipients on 
charitable behavior.  Yet, there was a significant interaction between emotional response 
levels and number of recipients on willingness to donate.  Rates of donation to groups 
were lower at lower emotional activation levels.  This partially supports the collapse of 
compassion explanation for lower helping behavior for groups.  While there were no 
overall differences in emotional responses for number of recipients, it does appear that 
people are willing to provide equal assistance to a larger number of recipients when at the 
higher levels of emotional arousal.   
 An interesting interaction was observed between number of recipients and anger 
on donation amount; people donated more money to the group at an accelerated pace as 
they became more angry.  A possible explanation is that the group of children was 
perceived as a single entity (i.e., a family) rather than a collection of single individuals.  
Work by Smith, Faro, and Burson (2013) showed that donations for groups increase 
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when the group is viewed as single, coherent unit.  Consequently, helping behavior may 
have increased for the group as anger increased because participants were donating to a 
perceived single entity, a family.  However this emotional interaction was not observed in 
Study 2, which may be attributable to the repeated-measures design of the study.  The 
average anger rating was higher in the second study because it was the combination of 
two emotional responses from two sources of anger.  The result from Study 1 may also be 
a Type I error, as the effect size is small.   
 Previous research (Zagefka et al., 2011; Zagefka et al., 2012) demonstrated that 
people were less helpful to survivors of humanly caused disasters than natural disasters.  
While there was not a significant main effect of type in Study 1, people did show reduced 
willingness to donate to the genocide conditions at low levels of the emotional reactions.  
Zagefka and colleagues (2011; 2012) suggest that differences in emotional and cognitive 
reactions are responsible for the discrepant helping behavior.  In contrast, participants in 
Study 2 were more willing to donate to the genocide conditions; however, significant 
order effects were found in this study so results should be evaluated cautiously.  Previous 
research (Kogut & Ritov, 2005b) demonstrated that the joint evaluation of two donation 
scenarios produced equal contributions.  In their study, which compared the number of 
recipients, 54% of the sample donated the same amount; in this case, 91% made uniform 
donations.  Thus, people seemed to be operating under the arithmetic equality social 
justice judgment (Sabbagh, Dar, Resh, 1994); they allocated equal resources to both 
scenarios regardless of personal traits and situational cues.   
 Still, when a between-subjects approach was used taking the first condition 
presented, no differences were found between event types for either likelihood of 
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donation or amount.  Consequently, both studies demonstrated no differences in donation 
amounts for the type of event.  This is contrary to what BTT would predict: donations 
would be lower for the higher betrayal events, the genocide conditions.  This was 
predicted because of hypothesized betrayal blindness in order to preserve a necessary 
attachment to human social relationships.  Perhaps the scenario stimuli were qualitatively 
distinct from our participants’ personal experiences and schemas so that the events did 
not threaten the “necessary relationship”; hence, betrayal blindness was not necessary.  
Future research should address this potential limitation by using more local disasters and 
recipients more similar to the participants.  Yet, the between-subjects results did show 
increased generosity for the lower betrayal versions of the events, as predicted.   
 Across both investigations, personal trauma was not directly associated with 
charitable giving.  This contradicts the results of Frazier et al. (2012) who found that 
more trauma exposure was associated with increased prosocial behaviors.  However, their 
study was correlational in design, relying on self-report measures of helping behaviors 
and volunteer activities.  Previous research by Gobin (2012) using the Trust Game (Berg, 
Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995) also demonstrated no effect of trauma history.  The Trust 
Game has been used by some researchers (e.g., Piff et al., 2010) as a measure of prosocial 
behavior.  Thus, there is some evidence that betrayal trauma history is not directly 
associated with prosocial behavior.   
 While there was not a significant main effect of trauma, both dissertation studies 
revealed a significant interaction between emotional response levels and trauma history 
on willingness to donate.  Those with a higher betrayal trauma history were less likely to 
donate at lower levels of the emotional reactions.  This is consistent with what is 
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suggested in the literature on the associations of prosocial behavior with correlates of 
betrayal trauma.  Future research should include these correlates to help tease apart any 
direct and indirect effects of betrayal trauma history.  Partially supporting Frazier et al.  
(2012), those with no trauma history were also less willing to donate with less emotional 
activation.  The events reported in the Frazier et al. (2012) study suggest most of the 
trauma histories would be considered lower betrayal traumas.  Thus, their study likely 
compared a no betrayal trauma group to a lower betrayal trauma group.  This may also 
explain the discrepancies in results between these studies and the Frazier et al. (2012) 
research.   
 Study 1 revealed a significant interaction between trauma history, number, and 
type of event.  Those with a low betrayal history donated significantly more to a single 
survivor of a natural disaster; however, they donated significantly more to a group of 
survivors from the external genocide condition.  This suggests there may have been some 
similarity effect occurring at the individual level.  However, this interaction was not 
observed in Study 2.  This may be due to the repeated-measures design of the study in 
that, when presented with two scenarios, the equality social justice judgment may have 
overpowered any perceived similarities between donor and recipient.   
 Higher levels of emotional responses predicted increased giving.  In Study 1, 
sympathy and guilt were associated with both greater willingness to donate and more 
generous donations.  Furthermore, Study 2 also showed a main effect for guilt, as well as 
a main effect for perceived impact of donation for both measures of charitable behavior.  
Similarly, increased anger was related to higher rates of donation in this experiment.  
When comparing the conditions to each other, people consistently donated more money 
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to the scenarios producing higher levels of guilt.  Interestingly, people with no betrayal 
trauma history were particularly impacted by differences in guilt responses compared to 
the other trauma groups.  These findings highlight the importance of the emotion guilt on 
promoting prosocial behavior and are consistent with previous research (Miller, 2010).   
Limitations and Future Directions 
 The results from these two studies provide interesting avenues of exploration in 
understanding how betrayal trauma is associated with charitable behavior.  However, it is 
important to note the limitations of the study to place the study findings in context.  Both 
studies utilized a college-aged sample that was predominantly Caucasian women.  Thus, 
findings may not generalize to samples with differing characteristics.  Future research 
should be conducted using more diverse samples, particularly because prosocial behavior 
has been shown to vary across these demographic factors (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011; 
Wiepking & Bekkers, 2012).   
 A high percentage of participants in both studies (94%, 93% in Study 1 and Study 
2, respectively) made a hypothetical donation; yet, studies that utilize real donations 
typically show lower rates of actual contributions (Kogut & Ritov, 2007; Dickert, 2008).  
Although there is some evidence that suggests self-reported donations are highly 
associated with actual donations (Zagefka et al., 2011), future research should address 
this using either real donations or at least asking a certainty question following the 
hypothetical donation (see Champ & Bishop, 2001).  Furthermore, the donation questions 
were asked at the end of the study; thus, participants may have been primed to act 
prosocially after completing the prosocial tendency questionnaires.  This may have 
artificially inflated helping.  A corollary of this limitation was a need to use multiple 
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nonparametric tests, rather than logistic regression, to explore the factors associated with 
likelihood of donation.  This statistical approach may have overestimated the effects of 
the predictors, as it did not allow for statistical controlling of the effects of the other 
constructs.  Future research can address this limitation by oversampling those who are 
unlikely to donate.   
 Both studies were completed online.  While this was done to hopefully reduce 
demand characteristics, this may have also resulted in biased findings.  Participants 
completed the measures unsupervised on their own time, limiting experimental control 
over environmental conditions.  It is possible that distractions may have interrupted or 
interfered with survey completion.  Additionally, responses may differ if obtained by 
tradition paper/pencil format compared to online data collection.  In a survey of Dutch 
adolescents, van de Looij-Jansen and de Wilde (2008) found significant differences in 
self-reported prosocial behavior based type of survey administration method.  
Participants had higher prosocial behavior scores when completing the survey using 
paper-and-pencil surveys.  Thus, results may have differed if the survey was completed in 
a lab session rather than at-home.  Additional research designs can explore this potential 
confounding factor to see if it applies to college-aged samples.     
 To truly understand how trauma history relates to prosocial behavior, longitudinal 
prospective research is warranted.  While there is a large literature on prosocial 
development (see Eisenberg, Fabes, & Spinrad, 2006), only one study (Koening et al., 
2004) has evaluated trauma history in a child sample.  Therefore, it is imperative 
additional research exploring trauma history, particularly betrayal trauma history, be 
conducted.   
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Summary and Conclusions 
 This dissertation examined charitable behavior within the context of betrayal 
trauma theory.  Both personal trauma history and betrayal levels of traumatic events were 
explored as possible correlates of help giving.   This research highlighted the import role 
emotional responses, particularly guilt, have on charitable giving and suggested methods 
to counteract the singularity effect and bias against humanly caused disasters.  By 
presenting both conditions simultaneously, there were no differences observed in 
donation amounts.  Minimizing perceived betrayal aspects of the events might also 
further increase donation amounts.  Findings also suggest that persons who have 
experienced low betrayal traumas may be a valuable target group for donations, as those 
without a trauma history or a high betrayal trauma history appear to be less willing to 
donate unless maximally emotionally activated.  These findings provide an important first 
step in understanding how betrayal trauma may impact prosocial behavior.   
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Table 34.  Summary of Findings. 
Hypothesis/Question 
Study 
1 
Result 
Study 1 Finding 
Study 
2 
Result 
Study 2 Finding 
Number of recipients  NS No difference in willingness or amount 
donated to single versus group 
NS No difference in willingness or 
amount donated to single versus 
group 
Increased affect on total amount 
donated 
* Sympathy and guilt associated with 
greater willingness to donate and 
increased amount donated 
* Anger, guilt, & impact were 
associated with greater willingness 
to donate; guilt & impact predicted 
total amount donated 
Type of event NS Willingness and amount did not vary 
across type of events 
* People more willing to donate to 
genocide; no difference in amount 
donated.  Between subjects approach 
showed no differences in willingness 
or amount donated.   
Betrayal level of event — — * No difference in willingness to 
donate or amount donated.  Between 
subjects approach found no 
difference in willingness but donated 
less to the high betrayal levels 
Personal Trauma History NS All trauma backgrounds had similar 
rates and amounts of donation 
NS No differences in willingness to 
donate or amount donated across 
trauma groups 
Interaction between number of 
recipients and type of event 
NS Willingness and amount did not vary 
across types and number of recipients 
NS No differences in willingness to 
donate or differences in amount 
donated based on number of 
recipients 
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Hypothesis/Question 
Study 
1 
Result 
Study 1 Finding 
Study 
2 
Result 
Study 2 Finding 
Interaction between trauma 
history and number of recipients 
NS No differences in trauma groups for 
willingness or amount based on the 
number of recipients 
NS Willingness to donate was the same 
across trauma histories for number 
of recipients; non-significant 
interaction on amount donated 
Interaction between trauma 
history and type of event 
NS People with divergent trauma histories 
did not respond differently to the types 
of events in terms of willingness to 
donate or amount donated 
NS Willingness to donate and amount 
donated to the two scenarios did not 
vary across trauma backgrounds 
Interaction between trauma 
history and betrayal level of 
event 
— — NS Trauma history did not result in 
differences in willingness to donate 
or amount donated for the low or 
high betrayal versions of the events 
Interaction between number, 
type, and trauma history 
* Low betrayal trauma group donated 
significantly more to the single, natural 
disaster survivor; low betrayal trauma 
group donated more to the group, 
external genocide 
NS There were not differences in the 
amounts donated to the two 
scenarios based on trauma history 
and number of recipients 
Interaction between emotional 
responses and number of 
recipients 
* People less willing to donate to the 
group of recipients at lower levels of the 
emotions; people donate more money to 
the group than the individual at a more 
accelerated pace when experiencing 
anger 
* Replicates study 1 findings on 
willingness to donate; no significant 
interactions between number and 
emotion ratings on amount donated 
Interaction between emotional 
responses and type of event 
* Less willing to donate to genocide 
conditions at low levels of the emotions; 
no differences in amount donated 
— — 
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Hypothesis/Question 
Study 
1 
Result 
Study 1 Finding 
Study 
2 
Result 
Study 2 Finding 
Interaction between emotional 
response and trauma history 
* Higher trauma group less willing to 
donate at lower levels of sympathy, 
sadness, guilt, and betrayal; no trauma 
history less willing to donate at lower 
levels of guilt; no interactions with 
amount donated;  
* Higher and no trauma history less 
willing to donate at lower levels of 
anger, sympathy, sadness, guilt, and 
impact; donation amounts not 
associated with these interactions 
Social value orientation  — — NS Those with a prosocial orientation 
were not more willing to donate and 
did not donate more 
Personality differences — — NS No differences in willingness to 
donate or amount donated for 
personality characteristics 
Social desirability — — NS Persons with higher social 
desirability did not donate larger 
amounts and were not more willing 
to donate  
Emotion regulation — — NS No differences in willingness to 
donate or amount donated based on 
endorsement of emotion regulation 
strategies 
Empathy — — NS Higher empathy was not associated 
with increased willingness to donate 
or amount donate 
Prosocialness — — NS Increased prosociality did not result 
in more willingness to donate or 
larger donation amounts 
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Hypothesis/Question 
Study 
1 
Result 
Study 1 Finding 
Study 
2 
Result 
Study 2 Finding 
Betrayal awareness — — NS Reduced betrayal awareness was not 
associated with lower willingness to 
donate or lower amounts donated 
Interaction between emotional 
responses and social value 
orientation 
— — * Those with prosocial and 
individualistic orientations less 
willing to donate at lower levels of 
all emotional response variables and 
impact  
Changes in emotional responses 
with differences in charitable 
behavior for type of event 
— — * Low power for willingness to 
donate; people donated more money 
to the conditions producing more 
guilt and impact  
Changes in emotional responses 
with differences in charitable 
behavior for betrayal level of 
event 
— — * Low power for willingness to 
donate; people donated more money 
to the betrayal level evoking more 
feelings of guilt 
Differences in donation amounts 
based on interaction between 
emotional response and trauma 
history 
— — * People with no trauma history 
donated more to one condition when 
there was a larger difference in guilt 
than the other trauma groups 
Betrayal awareness and 
type/betrayal level of event 
— — NS Betrayal awareness not associated 
with willingness to donate to any 
conditions; also, it was not 
associated with differences in 
donations to either type or betrayal 
level  
     
Note.  NS = nonsignificant finding; * = statistically significant finding.   
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APPENDIX A 
 
STUDY 1 MATERIALS  
 
 
Demographics Questionnaire 
 
Please answer the following questions.  
 
1) What is your age? 
  
2) What is your gender? 
 i) Male  
 ii) Female 
 
3) What is your race/ethnicity? 
 i) American Indian or Alaska Native 
 ii) Asian  
 iii) African American 
 iv) Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander 
 v) Caucasian 
 vi) Other 
 
For each question, participants have an option of selecting "I prefer not to respond" as 
well. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 129 
Brief Betrayal Trauma Survey (BBTS) 
For each item below, please mark one response for the question labeled “Before Age 18” 
and one response for the question labeled “Age 18 and older.” 
Listed below are questions for this section of the survey. Please provide a response for 
every question. If you are given the option to decline to answer a question, then 
declining to answer is considered a response.  
1. You were in a major earthquake, fire, flood, hurricane, or tornado that resulted in 
significant loss of personal property, serious injury to yourself or a significant other, the 
death of a significant other, or the fear of your own death. 
Before age 18 
 i) Never 
 ii) One or two times 
 iii) More than that 
Age 18 and older 
 i) Never 
 ii) One or two times 
 iii) More than that 
2. You were in a major automobile, boat, motorcycle, plane, train, or industrial accident 
that resulted in similar consequences. 
Before age 18 
 i) Never 
 ii) One or two times 
 iii) More than that 
Age 18 and older 
 i) Never 
 ii) One or two times 
 iii) More than that 
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3. You witnessed someone with whom you were very close (such as a parent, brother or 
sister, caretaker, or intimate partner) committing suicide, being killed, or being injured by 
another person so severely as to result in marks, bruises, burns, blood, or broken bones. 
This might include a close friend in combat. 
Before age 18 
 i) Never 
 ii) One or two times 
 iii) More than that 
Age 18 and older 
 i) Never 
 ii) One or two times 
 iii) More than that 
4. You witnessed someone with whom you were not so close undergoing a similar kind 
of traumatic event. 
Before age 18 
 i) Never 
 ii) One or two times 
 iii) More than that 
Age 18 and older 
 i) Never 
 ii) One or two times 
 iii) More than that 
5. You witnessed someone with whom you were very close deliberately attack another 
family member so severely as to result in marks, bruises, blood, broken bones, or broken 
teeth. 
Before age 18 
 i) Never 
 ii) One or two times 
 iii) More than that 
Age 18 and older 
 i) Never 
 ii) One or two times 
 iii) More than that 
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6. You witnessed someone with whom you were not so close deliberately attack a family 
member that severely. 
Before age 18 
 i) Never 
 ii) One or two times 
 iii) More than that 
Age 18 and older 
 i) Never 
 ii) One or two times 
 iii) More than that 
7. You were deliberately attacked that severely by someone with whom you were very 
close. 
Before age 18 
 i) Never 
 ii) One or two times 
 iii) More than that 
Age 18 and older 
 i) Never 
 ii) One or two times 
 iii) More than that 
8. You were deliberately attacked that severely by someone with whom you were not 
close. 
Before age 18 
 i) Never 
 ii) One or two times 
 iii) More than that 
Age 18 and older 
 i) Never 
 ii) One or two times 
 iii) More than that 
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9. You were made to have some form of sexual contact, such as touching or penetration, 
by someone with whom you were very close (such as a parent or lover). 
Before age 18 
 i) Never 
 ii) One or two times 
 iii) More than that 
Age 18 and older 
 i) Never 
 ii) One or two times 
 iii) More than that 
10. You were made to have such sexual contact by someone with whom you were not 
close. 
Before age 18 
 i) Never 
 ii) One or two times 
 iii) More than that 
Age 18 and older 
 i) Never 
 ii) One or two times 
 iii) More than that 
11. You were emotionally or psychologically mistreated over a significant period of time 
by someone with whom you were very close (such as a parent or lover). 
Before age 18 
 i) Never 
 ii) One or two times 
 iii) More than that 
Age 18 and older 
 i) Never 
 ii) One or two times 
 iii) More than that 
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12. You were emotionally or psychologically mistreated over a significant period of time 
by someone with whom you were not close.  
Before age 18 
 i) Never 
 ii) One or two times 
 iii) More than that 
Age 18 and older 
 i) Never 
 ii) One or two times 
 iii) More than that 
13. Experienced the death of one or more of your own children.  
 
Before age 18 
 i) Never 
 ii) One or two times 
 iii) More than that 
Age 18 and older 
 i) Never 
 ii) One or two times 
 iii) More than that 
14. Experienced a seriously traumatic event not already covered in any of these 
questions.  
 
Before age 18 
 i) Never 
 ii) One or two times 
 iii) More than that 
Age 18 and older 
 i) Never 
 ii) One or two times 
 iii) More than that 
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Charitable Donation Scenarios 
Natural Disaster Condition – Single Recipient 
Imagine you have taken part in a 4-hour psychology experiment for which you have just 
been paid $50 (10 five-dollar bills). On your way out of the experiment you are given the 
opportunity to donate any amount of your $50 to charity. 
Specifically, any money you donate will go to Rokia, a young girl from Africa. 
 
Rokia, 7 years old 
Rokia’s village recently experienced severe flooding, devastating their crops.  Like many 
members of her community, Rokia is having difficulty getting enough food and water to 
survive. With your support, Save the Children will provide her with the basic necessities, 
i.e., food, water, basic medical care, and hygiene. Your financial gift could help save her 
life. 
1. Would you be willing to donate money to help save Rokia? [Check one box.] 
 Yes   No   
2. If so, how much money would you be willing to donate? 
[Circle one amount.] 
$5 $10 $15 $20 $25 $30 $35 $40 $45 $50 
 
For the questions below, please circle the appropriate number to indicate how you 
feel about her situation. [Circle one number for each item.] 
 Not at all    Very much 
3.  After reading her story, I felt sad  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
4.  I felt sympathy and compassion 
towards her  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 135 
5.  I felt angry about her situation  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
6. I would feel guilty if I did not 
donate money to her                                                
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
7.   I believe what she experienced is a 
betrayal    
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Natural Disaster Condition – Group of Recipients 
Imagine you have taken part in a 4-hour psychology experiment for which you have just 
been paid $50 (10 five-dollar bills). On your way out of the experiment you are given the 
opportunity to donate any amount of your $50 to charity. 
Specifically, any money you donate will go to Munene, Rokia, Adesola, and Radhi, 
children from Africa. 
 
Munene, Rokia, Adesola, and Radhi 
 
Munene, Rokia, Adesola, and Radhi ‘s village recently experienced severe flooding, 
devastating their crops.  Like many members of their community who survived, they are 
having difficulty getting enough food and water to survive. With your support, Save the 
Children will provide the children with the basic necessities, i.e., food, water, basic 
medical care, and hygiene. Your financial gift could help save their lives. 
Would you be willing to donate money to help save Munene, Rokia, Adesola, and Radhi? 
[Check one box.] 
 Yes   No   
1. If so, how much money would you be willing to donate? 
[Circle one amount.] 
$5 $10 $15 $20 $25 $30 $35 $40 $45 $50 
 
For the questions below, please circle the appropriate number to indicate how you 
feel about their situation. [Circle one number for each item.] 
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Not at all Very much 
3.  After reading their story, I felt sad  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
4.  I felt sympathy and compassion 
towards them  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
5.  I felt angry about their situation  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
6. I would feel guilty if I did not 
donate money to them                                                
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
7.   I believe what they experienced is a 
betrayal    
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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External Genocide Condition  – Single Recipient 
Imagine you have taken part in a 4-hour psychology experiment for which you have just 
been paid $50 (10 five-dollar bills). On your way out of the experiment you are given the 
opportunity to donate any amount of your $50 to charity. 
Specifically, any money you donate will go to Rokia, a young girl from Africa. 
 
Rokia, 7 years old 
Members of a different village, who were intent on murdering the whole town, recently 
attacked Rokia’s home.  Like many members of her community who survived, Rokia is 
having difficulty getting enough food and water to survive. With your support, Save the 
Children will provide her with the basic necessities, i.e., food, water, basic medical care, 
and hygiene. Your financial gift could help save her life. 
1. Would you be willing to donate money to help save Rokia? [Check one box.] 
 Yes   No   
2. If so, how much money would you be willing to donate? 
[Circle one amount.] 
$5 $10 $15 $20 $25 $30 $35 $40 $45 $50 
 
For the questions below, please circle the appropriate number to indicate how you 
feel about Rokia’s situation. [Circle one number for each item.] 
 Not at all    Very much 
3.  After reading her story, I felt sad  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
4.  I felt sympathy and compassion 
towards her  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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5.  I felt angry about her situation  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
6. I would feel guilty if I did not 
donate money to her                                                
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
7.   I believe what she experienced is a 
betrayal    
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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External Genocide Condition – Group of Recipients 
Imagine you have taken part in a 4-hour psychology experiment for which you have just 
been paid $50 (10 five-dollar bills). On your way out of the experiment you are given the 
opportunity to donate any amount of your $50 to charity. 
Specifically, any money you donate will go to Munene, Rokia, Adesola, and Radhi, 
children from Africa. 
 
Munene, Rokia, Adesola, and Radhi 
 
Members of a different village, who were intent on murdering the whole town, recently 
attacked Munene, Rokia, Adesola, and Radhi’s home.  Like many members of their 
community who survived, they are having difficulty getting enough food and water to 
survive. With your support, Save the Children will provide the children with the basic 
necessities, i.e., food, water, basic medical care, and hygiene. Your financial gift could 
help save their lives. 
1. Would you be willing to donate money to help save Munene, Rokia, Adesola,  
and Radhi? [Check one box.] 
 Yes   No   
2. If so, how much money would you be willing to donate? 
[Circle one amount.] 
$5 $10 $15 $20 $25 $30 $35 $40 $45 $50 
For the questions below, please circle the appropriate number to indicate how you 
feel about their situation. [Circle one number for each item.] 
 Not at all    Very much 
3.  After reading their story, I felt sad  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
 141 
4.  I felt sympathy and compassion 
towards them  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
5.  I felt angry about their situation  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
6. I would feel guilty if I did not 
donate money to them                                               
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
7.   I believe what they experienced is a 
betrayal    
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Internal Genocide Condition – Single Recipient 
Imagine you have taken part in a 4-hour psychology experiment for which you have just 
been paid $50 (10 five-dollar bills). On your way out of the experiment you are given the 
opportunity to donate any amount of your $50 to charity. 
Specifically, any money you donate will go to Rokia, a young girl from Africa. 
 
Rokia, 7 years old 
 
Rokia (and her family) are members of the Abaka tribe, who have lived peacefully with 
the Masaba tribe in the same villages for generations. However, a civil war has recently 
erupted and Masabas, intent on murdering all Abakans, recently began attacking their 
neighbors. Like many members of the Abakan community who survived, Rokia is having 
difficulty getting enough food and water to survive. With your support, Save the Children 
will provide her with the basic necessities, i.e., food, water, basic medical care, and 
hygiene. Your financial gift could help save their lives. 
1. Would you be willing to donate money to help save Rokia? [Check one box.] 
 Yes   No   
2. If so, how much money would you be willing to donate? 
[Circle one amount.] 
$5 $10 $15 $20 $25 $30 $35 $40 $45 $50 
For the questions below, please circle the appropriate number to indicate how you 
feel about Rokia’s situation. [Circle one number for each item.] 
 Not at all    Very much 
3.  After reading her story, I felt sad  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
4.  I felt sympathy and compassion 
towards her  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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5.  I felt angry about her situation  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
6. I would feel guilty if I did not 
donate money to her                                                
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
7.   I believe what she experienced is a 
betrayal    
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Internal Genocide Condition – Group of Recipients 
Imagine you have taken part in a 4-hour psychology experiment for which you have just 
been paid $50 (10 five-dollar bills). On your way out of the experiment you are given the 
opportunity to donate any amount of your $50 to charity. 
Specifically, any money you donate will go to Munene, Rokia, Adesola, and Radhi, 
children from Africa. 
 
Munene, Rokia, Adesola, and Radhi 
 
 
Munene, Rokia, Adesola, and Radhi’s family are members of the Abaka tribe, who have 
lived peacefully with the Masaba tribe in the same villages for generations. However, a 
civil war has recently erupted and Masabas, intent on murdering all Abakans, recently 
began attacking their neighbors. Like many members of the Abakan community who 
survived, they are having difficulty getting enough food and water to survive. With your 
support, Save the Children will provide the children with the basic necessities, i.e., food, 
water, basic medical care, and hygiene. Your financial gift could help save their lives. 
1. Would you be willing to donate money to help save Munene, Rokia, Adesola,  
and Radhi? [Check one box.] 
 Yes   No   
2. If so, how much money would you be willing to donate? 
[Circle one amount.] 
$5 $10 $15 $20 $25 $30 $35 $40 $45 $50 
For the questions below, please circle the appropriate number to indicate how you 
feel about their situation. [Circle one number for each item.] 
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 Not at all    Very much 
3.  After reading their story, I felt sad  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
4.  I felt sympathy and compassion 
towards them  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
5.  I felt angry about their situation  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
6. I would feel guilty if I did not 
donate money to them                                               
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
7.   I believe what they experienced is a 
betrayal    
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
 
 
*Photo, entitled Temne children in Kabala, Sierra Leone (West Africa), taken by John 
Atherton in 1968. Photo publicly available via Flickr account gbaku: 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/gbaku/491589501/ 
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APPENDIX B 
 
STUDY 2 MATERIALS  
 
 
Demographics Questionnaire 
 
Please answer the following questions.  
 
 
1) What is your gender? 
 i) Male  
 ii) Female 
 iii) Transgender 
 
 
2) What is your ethnicity? Check all that apply. 
 i) Caucasian 
 ii) Hispanic  
 iii) African-American/Black 
 iv) Asian-American 
 v) Native-American 
 vi) Jamaican 
 vii) Asian 
 viii) Other 
 
3) What is your age (in years)? 
 
 
4) What is your religion?  
 i) Catholic 
 ii) Jewish 
 iii) Methodist 
 iv) Protestant 
 v) Nondenominational 
 vi) Baptist 
 vii) Other 
 
  
5) What is your sexual orientation?  
 i) Heterosexual 
 ii) Homosexual 
 iii) Bisexual 
 iv) Queer 
 v) Questioning  
 vi) None of the above 
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Big Five Inventory (BFI) 
 
Here are some statements that may or may not describe what you are like. Select the 
option that shows how much you agree or disagree that it describes you. For example, do 
you agree that you are someone who is bossy?   
 
1 
Disagree 
Strongly 
2 
Disagree 
a little 
3 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
4 
Agree 
a little 
5 
Agree 
strongly 
 
I see myself as someone who… 
 
____1. Is talkative 
 
____2. Tends to find fault with others 
 
____3. Does things carefully and completely 
 
____4. Is depressed, blue 
 
____5. Is original, comes up with new ideas 
 
____6. Reserved; keeps thoughts and feelings to self 
 
____7. Is helpful and unselfish with others 
 
____8. Can be somewhat careless 
 
____9. Is relaxed, handles stress well.   
 
____10. Is curious about many different things 
 
____11. Is full of energy 
 
____12. Starts quarrels with others 
 
____13. Is a reliable worker 
 
____14. Can be tense 
 
____15. Is clever, thinks a lot 
 
____16. Generates a lot of enthusiasm 
 
____17. Has a forgiving nature 
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____18. Tends to be disorganized 
 
____19. Worries a lot 
 
____20. Has an active imagination 
 
____21. Tends to be quiet 
 
____22. Is generally trusting 
 
____23. Tends to be lazy 
 
____24. Doesn’t get easily upset, emotionally stable 
 
____25. Is creative and inventive 
 
____26. Takes charge, has an assertive personality 
 
____27. Can be cold and distant with others 
 
____28. Keeps working until things are done 
 
____29. Can be moody 
 
____30. Likes artistic and creative experiences 
 
____31. Is sometimes shy, inhibited 
 
____32. Is considerate and kind to almost everyone 
 
____33. Does things efficiently (quickly and correctly) 
 
____34. Stays calm in tense situations 
 
____35. Likes work that is the same every time (routine) 
 
____36. Is outgoing, sociable 
 
____37. Is sometimes rude to others 
 
____38. Makes plans and sticks to them 
 
____39. Gets nervous easily 
 
____40. Likes to think and play with ideas 
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____41. Doesn’t like artistic things (plays, music) 
 
____42. Likes to cooperate; goes along with others 
 
____43. Is easily distracted; has trouble paying attention 
 
____44. Knows a lot about art, music, or books 
 
____45. Is the kind of person almost everyone likes 
 
____46. People really enjoy spending time with  
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Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) 
 
Please indicate how much you agree with each statement. 
 
 
1-----------2-----------3-----------4-----------5-----------6-----------7 
Not     Somewhat    Very 
True    True            True 
 
 
____  1. My first impressions of people usually turn out to be right. 
 
____  2. It would be hard for me to break any of my bad habits. 
 
____  3. I don't care to know what other people really think of me. 
 
____  4. I have not always been honest with myself. 
 
____  5. I always know why I like things. 
 
____  6. When my emotions are aroused, it biases my thinking. 
 
____  7. Once I've made up my mind, other people can seldom change my opinion. 
 
____  8. I am not a safe driver when I exceed the speed limit. 
 
____  9. I am fully in control of my own fate. 
 
____ 10. It's hard for me to shut off a disturbing thought. 
 
____ 11. I never regret my decisions. 
 
____ 12. I sometimes lose out on things because I can't make up my mind soon enough. 
 
____ 13. The reason I vote is because my vote can make a difference. 
 
____ 14. My parents were not always fair when they punished me. 
 
____ 15. I am a completely rational person. 
 
____ 16. I rarely appreciate criticism. 
 
____ 17. I am very confident of my judgments 
 
____ 18. I have sometimes doubted my ability as a lover. 
 
____ 19. It's all right with me if some people happen to dislike me. 
 
____ 20. I don't always know the reasons why I do the things I do. 
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____ 21. I sometimes tell lies if I have to. 
 
____ 22. I never cover up my mistakes. 
 
____ 23. There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone. 
 
____ 24. I never swear. 
 
____ 25. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget. 
 
____ 26. I always obey laws, even if I'm unlikely to get caught. 
 
____ 27. I have said something bad about a friend behind his/her back. 
 
____ 28. When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening. 
 
____ 29. I have received too much change from a salesperson without telling him or her. 
 
____ 30. I always declare everything at customs. 
 
____ 31. When I was young I sometimes stole things. 
 
____ 32. I have never dropped litter on the street. 
 
____ 33. I sometimes drive faster than the speed limit. 
 
____ 34. I never read sexy books or magazines. 
 
____ 35. I have done things that I don't tell other people about. 
 
____ 36. I never take things that don't belong to me. 
 
____ 37. I have taken sick-leave from work or school even though I wasn't really sick. 
 
____ 38. I have never damaged a library book or store merchandise without reporting it. 
 
____ 39. I have some pretty awful habits. 
 
____ 40. I don't gossip about other people's business. 
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Triple-Dominance Measure of Social Value Orientation (TDMSVO) 
 
In this task we ask you to imagine that you have been randomly paired with another 
person, whom we will refer to simply as the "Other." This other person is someone you 
do not know and that you will not knowingly meet in the future. Both you and the 
"Other" person will be making choices by circling either the letter A, B, or C. Your own 
choices will produce points for both yourself and the "Other" person. Likewise, the 
other's choice will produce points for him/her and for you. Every point has value: The 
more points you receive, the better for you, and the more points the "Other" receives, the 
better for him/her. 
 
Here's an example of how this task works: 
 
 A B C 
You get 500 500 550 
Other gets 100 500 300 
 
In this example, if you chose A you would receive 500 points and the other would receive 
100 points; if you chose B, you would receive 500 points and the other 500; and if you 
chose C, you would receive 550 points and the other 300. So, you see that your choice 
influences both the number of points you receive and the number of points the other 
receives. 
 
Before you begin making choices, please keep in mind that there are no right or wrong 
answers—choose the option that you, for whatever reason, prefer most. Also, remember 
that the points have value; the more of them you accumulate, the better for you. Likewise, 
from the "other's" point of view, the more points s/he accumulates, the better for him/her. 
 
For each of the nine choice situations, select A, B, or C, depending on which column you 
prefer most.  
 
1.  
 A B C 
You get 480 540 480 
Other gets 80 280 480 
 
2.  
 A B C 
You get 560 500 500 
Other gets 300 500 100 
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3.  
 A B C 
You get 520 520 580 
Other gets 520 120 320 
 
4.  
 A B C 
You get 500 560 490 
Other gets 100 300 490 
5.  
 A B C 
You get 560 500 490 
Other gets 300 500 90 
6.  
 A B C 
You get 500 500 570 
Other gets 500 100 300 
7.  
 A B C 
You get 510 560 510 
Other gets 510 300 110 
8. 
 A B C 
You get 550 500 500 
Other gets 300 100 500 
9.  
 A B C 
You get 480 490 540 
Other gets 100 490 300 
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Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ) 
 
We would like to ask you some questions about your emotional life, in particular, how 
you control (that is, regulate and manage) your emotions. The questions below involve 
two distinct aspects of your emotional life. One is your emotional experience, or what 
you feel like inside. The other is your emotional expression, or how you show your 
emotions in the way you talk, gesture, or behave. Although some of the following 
questions may seem similar to one another, they differ in important ways.  
Select one response to indicate your agreement or disagreement for each item.  
 
1-----------2-----------3-----------4-----------5-----------6-----------7 
Strongly    Neutral    Strongly 
Disagree               Agree 
 
____  1. When I want to feel more positive emotion (such as joy or amusement), I change 
   what I’m thinking about. 
____  2. I keep my emotions to myself. 
 
____  3. When I want to feel less negative emotion (such as sadness or anger), I change  
   what I’m thinking about. 
 
____  4. When I am feeling positive emotions, I am careful not to express them. 
 
____  5. When I’m faced with a stressful situation, I make myself think about it in a way  
   that helps me stay calm. 
 
____  6. I control my emotions by not expressing them. 
 
____  7. When I want to feel more positive emotion, I change the way I’m thinking about   
   the situation. 
____  8. I control my emotions by changing the way I think about the situation I’m in.  
 
____  9. When I am feeling negative emotions, I make sure not to express them. 
 
____ 10. When I want to feel less negative emotion, I change the way I’m thinking about   
    the situation. 
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Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) 
 
Please read each statement carefully and consider how well or poorly it describes you as 
a person. Then respond to the statement as accurately as possible using the following 
scale. Choose the response that best indicates the degree to which each statement 
describes you.  
a. 
Does Not 
Describe Me 
Very Well 
b. 
 
c. 
 
d. 
 
e. 
Describes 
Me Very 
Well 
 
____  1. I daydream and fantasize, with some regularity, about things that might happen 
   to me. 
 
____  2. I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than I am. 
 
____  3. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of view. 
 
____  4. Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they're having      
   problems. 
 
____  5. I really get involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel. 
 
____  6. In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease. 
 
____  7. I am usually objective when I watch a movie or play, and I don't often get  
  completely caught up in it. 
 
____  8. I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision. 
 
____  9. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards 
   them. 
 
____ 10. I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very emotional situation. 
 
____ 11. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look  
    from their perspective. 
 
____ 12. Becoming extremely involved in a good book or movie is somewhat rare for 
   me. 
 
____ 13. When I see someone get hurt, I tend to remain calm. 
 
____ 14. Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal. 
 
____ 15. If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other    
    people's arguments. 
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____ 16. After seeing a play or a movie, I have felt as though I were one of the    
    characters. 
 
____ 17. Being in a tense emotional situation scares me. 
 
____ 18. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much  
    pity for them. 
 
____ 19. I am usually pretty effective in dealing with emergencies. 
 
____ 20. I am often quite touched by things that I see happen. 
 
____ 21. I believe there are two sides to every question and I try to look at them both. 
 
____ 22. I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person. 
 
____ 23. When I watch a good movie, I can very easily put myself in the place of a  
  leading character. 
 
____ 24. I tend to lose control during emergencies. 
 
____ 25. When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a  
    while. 
 
____ 26. When I am reading an interesting story or novel, I imagine how I would feel if  
    the events in the story were happening to me. 
 
____ 27. When I see someone who badly needs help in an emergency, I go to pieces. 
 
____ 28. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their  
    place. 
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Prosocialness Scale for Adults 
 
The following statements describe a large number of common situations. There are no 
“right” or “wrong” answers; the best answer is the immediate, spontaneous one. Read 
carefully each phrase and mark the answer that reflects your first reaction. 
 
1-----------------2------------------3------------------4------------------5 
 
 
___1. I am pleased to help my friends/colleagues in their activities  
___2. I share the things that I have with my friends  
___3. I try to help others  
___4. I am available for volunteer activities to help those who are in need  
___5. I am empathetic with those who are in need  
___6. I help immediately those who are in need  
___7. I do what I can to help others avoid getting into trouble  
___8. I intensely feel what others feel  
___9. I am willing to make my knowledge and abilities available to others  
___10. I try to console those who are sad  
___11. I easily lend money or other things  
___12. I easily put myself in the shoes of those who are in discomfort  
___13. I try to be close to and take care of those who are in need  
___14. I easily share with friends any good opportunity that comes to me  
___15. I spend time with those friends who feel lonely  
___16. I immediately sense my friends’ discomfort even when it is not directly 
 communicated to me 
 
 
 
 
 
Never              Occasionally          Sometimes                 Often               Almost    
True                      True                       True            True    Always                                  
          True 
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Betrayal Detection Measure 
 
We are interested in how often you have experienced situations similar to the ones listed 
below and how you reacted to these situations. Read each statement below carefully and 
respond to each item honestly. 
1) You tell your close friend, Amy, a deep secret that you have not shared with anyone 
else. She promises to keep your secret. A few weeks later, you discover that Amy has 
shared your secret with other individuals. How many times has a situation similar to the 
one described above happen to you? 
 
Never 1 time   2-5 times 6-20 times 21-100 times more than 100 times 
 
How aware were you that you had been betrayed by your friend? 
 a) Completely unaware. 
 b) Somewhat unaware.  
 c) I could have been aware if I wanted to be.  
 d) Somewhat aware.  
 e) I was completely aware.  
 f) Other (please explain)____________ 
 
2) You experience a traumatic event in your life (i.e., a death in the family, a major 
disappointment, a car accident). You go to your friend seeking social support. Your 
friend does not respond with the social support you were hoping for. How many times 
has this happen to you? 
 
Never 1 time   2-5 times 6-20 times 21-100 times more than 100 times 
 
How aware were you that you had been betrayed by your friend? 
 a) Completely unaware. 
 b) Somewhat unaware.  
 c) I could have been aware if I wanted to be.  
 d) Somewhat aware.  
 e) I was completely aware.  
 f) Other (please explain)____________ 
 
3) You get an award for your outstanding academic, athletic, or community service 
achievements. You are excited to share the news with your close friend Scott. When you 
tell Scott he reacts as if he doesn’t care at all about your good news. How many times has 
something like this happen to you? 
 
Never 1 time   2-5 times 6-20 times 21-100 times more than 100 times 
 
How aware were you that you had been betrayed by your friend? 
 a) Completely unaware. 
 b) Somewhat unaware.  
 c) I could have been aware if I wanted to be.  
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 d) Somewhat aware.  
 e) I was completely aware.  
 f) Other (please explain)____________ 
 
4) A family member promised you something very important to you, but never delivered 
on his/her promise. How many times has this happen to you? 
 
Never 1 time   2-5 times 6-20 times 21-100 times more than 100 times 
 
How aware were you that you had been betrayed by your friend? 
 a) Completely unaware. 
 b) Somewhat unaware.  
 c) I could have been aware if I wanted to be.  
 d) Somewhat aware.  
 e) I was completely aware.  
 f) Other (please explain)____________ 
 
5) You played a card game or board game with a friend and your friend won by cheating. 
How many times has someone cheated you in order to win a game? 
 
Never 1 time   2-5 times 6-20 times 21-100 times more than 100 times 
 
How aware were you that you had been betrayed by your friend? 
 a) Completely unaware. 
 b) Somewhat unaware.  
 c) I could have been aware if I wanted to be.  
 d) Somewhat aware.  
 e) I was completely aware.  
 f) Other (please explain)____________ 
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Brief Betrayal Trauma Survey (BBTS) 
We hope that you trust us to keep your responses in complete confidence and privacy; 
this is the reason that we ask you not to include your name on any of our questionnaires. 
Nonetheless, if you feel uncomfortable answering any of the more intimate questions in 
this section, just skip them, and go on to the next section. For each item below, please 
mark one response in the columns labeled "Before Age 12," one response in the columns 
labeled "Age 12 through 17," AND one response in the columns labeled "Age 18 
and Older." 
  
Have each of the following events happened to you? 
 Before 
Age 12 
Age 12 
through 
17 
Age 18 
and older 
 Yes (1) 
No 
(0) 
Yes 
(1) 
No 
(0) 
Yes 
(1) 
No 
(0) 
Been in a major earthquake, fire, flood, hurricane, or 
tornado that resulted in significant loss of personal 
property, serious injury to yourself or a significant other, 
the death of a significant other, or the fear of your own 
death (1) 
° ° ° ° ° ° 
Been in a major automobile, boat, motorcycle, plane, 
train, or industrial accident that resulted in similar 
consequences (2) 
° ° ° ° ° ° 
Personally witnessed someone with whom YOU WERE 
VERY CLOSE (such as a parent, brother or sister, 
caretaker, or intimate partner) committing suicide, being 
killed, or being injured by another person so severely as 
to result in marks, bruises, burns, blood, or broken bones. 
This might include a close friend in combat (3) 
° ° ° ° ° ° 
Personally witnessed someone with whom you were NOT 
so close undergoing a similar kind of traumatic event (4) ° ° ° ° ° ° 
Personally witnessed someone with whom YOU WERE 
VERY CLOSE deliberately attack one of your family 
members so severely as to result in marks, bruises, blood, 
broken bones, or broken teeth (5) 
° ° ° ° ° ° 
Personally witnessed someone with whom you were NOT 
so close deliberately attack a member of your family that 
severely (6) 
° ° ° ° ° ° 
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Please specify any seriously traumatic events NOT COVERED by the previous 
questions. 
 
 
 
You were deliberately attacked that severely by someone 
with whom YOU WERE VERY CLOSE (7) ° ° ° ° ° ° 
You were deliberately attacked that severely by someone 
with whom you were NOT so close (8) ° ° ° ° ° ° 
You were made to have some form of sexual contact, 
such as touching or penetration, by someone with whom 
YOU WERE VERY CLOSE (such as a parent or lover) 
(9) 
° ° ° ° ° ° 
You were made to have such sexual contact by someone 
with whom you were NOT so close (10) ° ° ° ° ° ° 
You were emotionally or psychologically mistreated over 
a significant period of time by someone with whom YOU 
WERE VERY CLOSE (such as a parent or lover) (11) 
° ° ° ° ° ° 
You were emotionally or psychologically mistreated over 
a significant period of time by someone with whom you 
were NOT close (12) 
° ° ° ° ° ° 
Experienced the death of one or more of your own 
children (13) ° ° ° ° ° ° 
Experienced a seriously traumatic event not already 
covered in any of these questions (please specify below) 
(14) 
° ° ° ° ° ° 
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Charitable Donation Scenarios 
 
High Flood versus Low Genocide – Single Recipient 
 
 
Rokia 
 
After a poorly built bridge collapsed, Rokia’s village recently experienced massive 
flooding, devastating their crops. Despite previous warnings to trusted local officials of 
its instability, they chose to direct funds to building a resort rather than fixing the bridge. 
Like many members of her community who survived, Rokia is having difficulty getting 
enough food and water to survive.  
 
For the questions below, please circle the appropriate number to indicate how you feel 
about her situation. [Circle one number for each item.] 
 
 Not at all    Very much 
After reading her story, I feel sad  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
I feel sympathy and compassion 
towards her  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
I feel angry about her situation  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
I believe what she experienced is a 
betrayal    
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Faida 
 
Members of a different village, who were intent on murdering the whole town, recently 
attacked Faida’s home.  Like many members of her community who survived, Faida is 
having difficulty getting enough food and water to survive.  
 
For the questions below, please circle the appropriate number to indicate how you feel 
about her situation. [Circle one number for each item.] 
 
 Not at all    Very much 
After reading her story, I feel sad  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
I feel sympathy and compassion 
towards her  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
I feel angry about her situation  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
I believe what she experienced is a 
betrayal    
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Imagine you have taken part in a 4-hour psychology experiment for which you have just 
been paid $100 On your way out of the experiment you are given the opportunity to 
donate any amount of your $100 to charity to help the children from the previous 2 
scenarios. With your support, Save the Children will provide Rokia and Faida with the 
basic necessities, i.e., food, water, basic medical care, and hygiene. Your financial gift 
could help save their lives. The sum of the next 3 questions must equal 100. 
  
How much would you be willing to donate to Rokia, whose village was destroyed by a 
flood (0 to 100)?  
 
How much would you be willing to donate to Faida, whose village was attacked by 
members of another village (0 to 100)?  
 
How much would you like to keep for yourself (0 to 100)?  
 
I would feel guilty if I did not donate money to Rokia 
Not at all    Very much 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I believe a donation to Rokia will make a difference 
Not at all    Very much 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
I would feel guilty if I did not donate money to Faida 
Not at all    Very much 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I believe a donation to Faida will make a difference 
Not at all    Very much 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Low Flood versus High Genocide – Single Recipient 
 
 
Rokia 
 
After a long period of heavy rain, Rokia’s village recently experienced massive flooding, 
devastating their crops.  Like many members of her community who survived, Rokia is 
having difficulty getting enough food and water to survive. 
 
For the questions below, please circle the appropriate number to indicate how you feel 
about her situation. [Circle one number for each item.] 
 
 Not at all    Very much 
After reading her story, I feel sad  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
I feel sympathy and compassion 
towards her  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
I feel angry about her situation  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
I believe what she experienced is a 
betrayal    
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Faida 
 
Faida (and her family) are members of the Abaka tribe, who have lived peacefully with 
the Masaba tribe in the same villages for generations. Members of the Abaka and Masaba 
have even married and started families together. However, a civil war has recently 
erupted and Masabas, intent on murdering all Abakans, recently began attacking their 
neighbors and Abakan family members. The government is making no effort to stop the 
attacks. Like many members of the Abakan community who survived, Faida is having 
difficulty getting enough food and water to survive. 
 
For the questions below, please circle the appropriate number to indicate how you feel 
about her situation. [Circle one number for each item.] 
 
 Not at all    Very much 
After reading her story, I feel sad  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
I feel sympathy and compassion 
towards her  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
I feel angry about her situation  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
I believe what she experienced is a 
betrayal    
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Imagine you have taken part in a 4-hour psychology experiment for which you have just 
been paid $100 On your way out of the experiment you are given the opportunity to 
donate any amount of your $100 to charity to help the children from the previous 2 
scenarios. With your support, Save the Children will provide Rokia and Faida with the 
basic necessities, i.e., food, water, basic medical care, and hygiene. Your financial gift 
could help save their lives. The sum of the next 3 questions must equal 100. 
  
How much would you be willing to donate to Rokia, whose village was destroyed by a 
flood (0 to 100)?  
 
How much would you be willing to donate to Faida, who is being attacked by neighbors 
and family members (0 to 100)?  
 
How much would you like to keep for yourself (0 to 100)?  
 
I would feel guilty if I did not donate money to Rokia 
Not at all    Very much 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I believe a donation to Rokia will make a difference 
Not at all    Very much 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
I would feel guilty if I did not donate money to Faida 
Not at all    Very much 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I believe a donation to Faida will make a difference 
Not at all    Very much 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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High Flood versus Low Genocide – Group of Recipients 
 
 
Munene, Rokia, Adesola, and Radhi 
 
 
After a poorly built bridge collapsed, Munene, Rokia, Adesola, and Radhi ‘s village 
recently experienced massive flooding, devastating their crops. Despite previous 
warnings to trusted local officials of its instability, they chose to direct funds to building a 
resort rather than fixing the bridge. Like many members of their community who 
survived, Munene, Rokia, Adesola, and Radhi are having difficulty getting enough food 
and water to survive. 
 
For the questions below, please circle the appropriate number to indicate how you feel 
about their situation. [Circle one number for each item.] 
 
 Not at all    Very much 
After reading their story, I feel sad  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
I feel sympathy and compassion 
towards them  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
I feel angry about their situation  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
I believe what they experienced is a 
betrayal    
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Abla, Faida, Jenebi, and Nnamdi 
 
 
Members of a different village, who were intent on murdering the whole town, recently 
attacked Abla, Faida, Jenebi, and Nnamdi’s homes.  Like many members of their 
community who survived,  
Abla, Faida, Jenebi, and Nnamdi are having difficulty getting enough food and water to 
survive.  
 
For the questions below, please circle the appropriate number to indicate how you feel 
about their situation. [Circle one number for each item.] 
 
 Not at all    Very much 
After reading their story, I feel sad  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
I feel sympathy and compassion 
towards them  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
I feel angry about their situation  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
I believe what they experienced is a 
betrayal    
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Imagine you have taken part in a 4-hour psychology experiment for which you have just 
been paid $100 On your way out of the experiment you are given the opportunity to 
donate any amount of your $100 to charity to help the children from the previous 2 
scenarios. With your support, Save the Children will provide the children with the basic 
necessities, i.e., food, water, basic medical care, and hygiene. Your 
financial gift could help save their lives. The sum of the next 3 questions must equal 100. 
 
How much would you be willing to donate to Munene, Rokia, Adesola, and Radhi, whose 
village was destroyed by a flood (0 to 100)?  
 
How much would you be willing to donate to Abla, Faida, Jenebi, and Nnamdi, whose 
village was attacked by members of another village (0 to 100)?  
 
How much would you like to keep for yourself (0 to 100)?  
 
 
I would feel guilty if I did not donate money to Munene, Rokia, Adesola, and Radhi 
Not at all    Very much 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I believe a donation to Munene, Rokia, Adesola, and Radhi will make a difference 
Not at all    Very much 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
I would feel guilty if I did not donate money to Abla, Faida, Jenebi, and Nnamdi 
Not at all    Very much 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I believe a donation to Abla, Faida, Jenebi, and Nnamdi will make a difference 
Not at all    Very much 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Low Flood versus High Genocide – Group of Recipients 
 
 
Munene, Rokia, Adesola, and Radhi 
 
After a long period of heavy rain, Munene, Rokia, Adesola, and Radhi‘s village recently 
experienced massive flooding, devastating their crops.  Like many members of their 
community who survived, Munene, Rokia, Adesola, and Radhi are having difficulty 
getting enough food and water to survive.  
 
For the questions below, please circle the appropriate number to indicate how you feel 
about their situation. [Circle one number for each item.] 
 
 Not at all    Very much 
After reading their story, I feel sad  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
I feel sympathy and compassion 
towards them  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
I feel angry about their situation  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
I believe what they experienced is a 
betrayal    
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Abla, Faida, Jenebi, and Nnamdi 
Abla, Faida, Jenebi, and Nnamdi‘s families are members of the Abaka tribe, who have 
lived peacefully with the Masaba tribe in the same villages for generations. Members of 
the Abaka and Masaba have even married and started families together. However, a civil 
war has recently erupted and Masabas, intent on murdering all Abakans, recently began 
attacking their neighbors and Abakan family members. The government is making no 
effort to stop the attacks. Like many members of the Abakan community who survived, 
Abla, Faida, Jenebi, and Nnamdi are having difficulty getting enough food and water to 
survive. 
 
For the questions below, please circle the appropriate number to indicate how you feel 
about their situation. [Circle one number for each item.] 
 Not at all    Very much 
After reading their story, I feel sad  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
I feel sympathy and compassion 
towards them  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
I feel angry about their situation  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
I believe what they experienced is a 
betrayal    
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Imagine you have taken part in a 4-hour psychology experiment for which you have just 
been paid $100 On your way out of the experiment you are given the opportunity to 
donate any amount of your $100 to charity to help the children from the previous 2 
scenarios. With your support, Save the Children will provide the children with the basic 
necessities, i.e., food, water, basic medical care, and hygiene. Your 
financial gift could help save their lives. The Sum of the next 3 questions must equal 100. 
 
How much would you be willing to donate to Munene, Rokia, Adesola, and Radhi, whose 
village was destroyed by a flood (0 to 100)?  
 
How much would you be willing to donate to Abla, Faida, Jenebi, and Nnamdi, who are 
being attacked by neighbors and family members (0 to 100)? 
 
How much would you like to keep for yourself (0 to 100)?  
 
I would feel guilty if I did not donate money to Munene, Rokia, Adesola, and Radhi 
Not at all    Very much 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I believe a donation to Munene, Rokia, Adesola, and Radhi will make a difference 
Not at all    Very much 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
I would feel guilty if I did not donate money to Abla, Faida, Jenebi, and Nnamdi 
Not at all    Very much 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I believe a donation to Abla, Faida, Jenebi, and Nnamdi will make a difference 
Not at all    Very much 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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*Photo, entitled Temne children in Kabala, Sierra Leone (West Africa), taken by John 
Atherton circa 1968. Photo publicly available via Flickr account gbaku: 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/gbaku/491589501/ 
 
 
 
 
*Photo, #07-1068, taken by John Gordon on 11/05/2007. Altered to black-and-white. 
Photo publicly available via United Methodist News Service (UMNS): 
http://tinyurl.com/9wa2jjc 
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